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Article
Everything Radiates: Does the Fourth Amendment
Regulate Side-Channel Cryptanalysis?
RIANA PFEFFERKORN
Encryption shields private information from malicious eavesdroppers. After
years of slow adoption, encryption is finally becoming widespread in consumeroriented electronic devices and communications services. Consumer-oriented
encryption software is now more user-friendly, and much of it turns on encryption
by default. These advances enhance privacy and security for millions of people.
However, encryption also poses an impediment to law enforcement’s ability to
gather electronic evidence. Law enforcement calls this the “going dark” problem.
U.S. law enforcement agencies have responded through both legal and
technological means to encryption’s perceived threat to their capabilities. The
scope of encryption’s impact on those capabilities is not yet clear, and police still
have a wealth of data and technical tools at their disposal. Nevertheless,
sophisticated criminals can use encryption to stymie investigators, forcing them to
resort to resource-intensive, tailored measures to investigate those individuals.
One means of doing so is through a “side-channel attack.” Our electronic
devices are always radiating something—electromagnetic emissions, heat, and so
forth. Those emissions reveal information, called “side channel information,”
about the device. The physical implementation of a cryptosystem leaks
electromagnetic emissions from which academic researchers have shown it is
possible to extract the system’s secret encryption keys. Side-channel cryptanalysis
is not a known law enforcement tactic at present, but that may change in time.
Law enforcement use of side-channel attacks will raise Fourth Amendment
issues that will require a fact-intensive analysis to resolve. In determining what
legal process (if any) will authorize a side-channel attack, a court will have to
carefully examine what information will be acquired, from where, and how. The
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not provide clear,
predictable guidance for those inquiries. Its decision in Kyllo v. United States
supplies the touchstone for the legal analysis of side-channel attacks. However,
the Court’s current framework for electronic surveillance cannot adequately
safeguard Americans’ privacy interests from erosion by technological advances.
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Everything Radiates: Does the Fourth Amendment
Regulate Side-Channel Cryptanalysis?
RIANA PFEFFERKORN*
INTRODUCTION
1

“Everything vibrates.” Actually, “everything radiate[s].”2 Every
physical implementation of a cryptosystem leaks something—
electromagnetic radiation, power consumption, sound, or some other
emission. Those leakages can be measured, and those measurements reveal
information—likely against the cryptosystem user’s wishes and without
her knowledge.
In cryptography, these sources of indirect information are called side
channels. A side-channel attack on a cryptosystem seeks to gain
information from physical leakages, rather than by other, more direct
methods of cryptanalysis.
At present, side-channel attacks are (to our knowledge) the business of
America’s military and intelligence agencies, not its police. They are
typically complex and resource-intensive, limiting their feasibility for law
enforcement use. That said, such attacks have become more affordable
over time, and technologies that originated in military and intelligence use
have a tendency to trickle down to garden-variety police departments.
Meanwhile, as commercially-available, relatively easy-to-use encryption
software gains widespread favor among Americans, law enforcement
officials have been exploring options for circumventing encryption to gain
access to data and communications in intelligible form. In time, law
enforcement may seek to resort to certain types of side-channel attack to
gather information after exhausting other means of investigating a
sophisticated, high-value target.
*
Cryptography Fellow, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. Thank you to
Chantelle Ankerman and the staff of the Connecticut Law Review for inviting me to participate in the
Connecticut Law Review’s January 2017 Symposium and publish in its corresponding Symposium
issue. Many thanks also to Jennifer Granick, Josh Myer, and Brian Pascal for their helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this Article. Any remaining errors are my own.
1
See Dahlia Lithwick, Everything Vibrates, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2008, 7:40 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2008/11/everything_vibrat
es.html [https://perma.cc/R8YM-JB44] (discussing a delightful aphorism of the Summum religious
organization); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 465 n.1, 466 (2009) (featuring
a discussion of the Seven Aphorisms of the Summum in the context of an Establishment Clause case).
2
Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book I: The
Struggle for Centralization, 1945-1960, in 5 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY 221 (1995).
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When that time comes, investigators will have to consider whether the
Fourth Amendment regulates their gathering of side-channel information.3
Do the police need a warrant to obtain information about a target through a
side-channel attack? That’s the question this Article seeks to answer. The
conclusion: It depends.
I. WHAT IS SIDE-CHANNEL CRYPTANALYSIS?
Cryptography is the discipline of protecting secrets4 through coded
writing.5 Encryption is “the transformation of data into a form that is as
close to impossible as possible to read without the appropriate knowledge .
. . [namely,] []a key.”6 An encryption algorithm turns human-readable
language (“plaintext”) into an unintelligible scramble (“ciphertext”) that
ostensibly can only be decoded using a decryption key.7 Encryption keeps
the encoded information secret from anyone who is not intended to have
access to it, even if that person has access to the ciphertext.8
Cryptanalysis is “the flip-side of cryptography:”9 the study of codebreaking.10 There are a number of different methods of modern
cryptanalysis. One class of techniques exploits weaknesses in the
encryption algorithm. For example, an algorithm may produce seemingly
random ciphertext that in fact contains patterns which the attacker

3
The Fourth Amendment’s constraints on intelligence activities—as opposed to domestic law
enforcement—are beyond the scope of this Article.
4
See RSA Laboratories, 1.2 What is Cryptography?, DELLEMC, https://singapore.emc.com/emcplus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-cryptography.htm
[https://perma.cc/L9TW-JJVA]
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter What is Cryptography?] (“To most people, cryptography is concerned
with keeping communications private.”); see also ALFRED J. MENEZES ET AL., HANDBOOK OF APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY 1 (1996) [hereinafter HAC] (indicating that cryptography is a tool for protecting
“secrets and strategies”).
5
Cryptography, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45374
[https://perma.cc/3QMD-7YCJ ] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
6
What is Cryptography?, supra note 4; see also Datatreasury Corp. v. Ingenico S.A., No. 02-cv95, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31457, at *68 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2004) (defining “encrypt” to mean “the
transformation of data into a form unreadable by anyone without a secret decryption key. Its purpose is
to ensure privacy by keeping the information hidden from anyone for whom it is not intended.”); Ryan
Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 37 (2016) (defining encryption as
“the process of rendering communications unreadable to anyone but the recipient”). Note, however,
that Professor Calo’s definition does not encompass the encryption of stored data, such as files on a
laptop.
7
What is Cryptography?, supra note 4; see also Steven M. Bellovin, INTRODUCTION TO
CRYPTOGRAPHY 4 (2016) [hereinafter BELLOVIN, INTRO], https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/
classes/f16/l_crypt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSV3-JKPN] (providing certain materials for lecture in
COMS W4180 Network Security course at Columbia University).
8
What is Cryptography?, supra note 4.
9
RSA Laboratories, 2.4.1 What Is Cryptanalysis?, DELLEMC, https://www.emc.com/emcplus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-cryptanalysis.htm [https://perma.cc/RH48-VYQB] (last
visited Feb. 6, 2017).
10
Id.
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(“cryptanalyst”) can analyze to crack the secret code.
Another class of techniques, called side-channel attacks, gains
information about the targeted cryptosystem12 by exploiting weaknesses in
its physical implementation.13 Side-channel cryptanalysis works by
measuring information that the physical implementation of the
cryptosystem emits through side channels.14 Side-channel information
includes motion,15 sound emitted during a computation,16 a device’s

11
For example, an attacker can apply “frequency analysis” to ciphertext, checking which letters
occur most often; she guesses that they correspond to the most frequent letters in English (assuming the
plaintext is in English), and guesses the rest of the letters from there. Simon Singh, Letter Frequencies,
SIMONSINGH,
http://www.simonsingh.net/The_Black_Chamber/letterfrequencies.html
[https://perma.cc/ZER4-JDMU] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
12
A cryptosystem “is a general term referring to a set of cryptographic primitive[] [tools] used to
provide information security services. Most often the term is used in conjunction with primitives
providing confidentiality, i.e., encryption.” HAC, supra note 4, at 15. Put more simply, “[a]
cryptosystem is pair of algorithms that take a key and . . . convert plaintext to ciphertext and back.”
BELLOVIN, INTRO, supra note 7, at 4.
13
FRANÇOIS KOEUNE ET AL., A TUTORIAL ON PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SIDE-CHANNEL
ATTACKS, in FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN III 78–108 (2005) [hereinafter
KOEUNE].
14
See Dan Goodin, New Attack Steals E-Mail Decryption Keys by Capturing Computer Sounds,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/new-attack-stealse-mail-decryption-keys-by-capturing-computer-sounds/
[https://perma.cc/YG6U-H28T]
(“[C]ryptanalytic side-channel attacks . . . target cryptographic implementations that leak secret
information through power consumption, electromagnetic emanations, timing differences, or other
indirect channels.”).
15
See, e.g., LIANG CAI & HAO CHEN, TOUCHLOGGER: INFERRING KEYSTROKES ON TOUCH
SCREEN FROM SMARTPHONE MOTION 1 (2011) [hereinafter TOUCHLOGGER], https://www.usenix.org/
legacy/event/hotsec11/tech/final_files/Cai.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8Q7-55V3] (describing how it is
possible to log keystrokes on smartphones with touchscreens, due to the fact that “keystroke
vibration[s] on touch screens are highly correlated to the keys being typed”) (paper delivered at 6th
Usenix Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec’11)); see also Zhi Xu ET AL., TAPLOGGER:
INFERRING USER INPUTS ON SMARTPHONE TOUCHSCREENS USING ON-BOARD MOTION SENSORS 2
(2012),
http://www.cse.psu.edu/~sxz16/papers/taplogger.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MCA-3AZD]
[hereinafter TAPLOGGER] (indicating that keystrokes can be inferred through motion sensor data)
(paper delivered at the Fifth ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (WiSec 2012)). Both of
these publications assume that the smartphone’s user installs malware that reads the data from the
phone’s motion sensors and transmits it back to the attacker, i.e., that the side-channel information is
being measured directly from the device, not remotely. Similarly, recent research demonstrated an inbrowser JavaScript-based side channel attack (i.e., no app download needed) that can infer user PINs
with high accuracy using side-channel information from a mobile device’s motion and orientation
sensors. MARYAM MEHRNEZHAD ET AL., STEALING PINS VIA MOBILE SENSORS: ACTUAL RISK VERSUS
USER PERCEPTION (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.05549v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8DL-LN7C]
[hereinafter STEALING PINS].
16
See, e.g., Adi Shamir & Eran Tromer, Acoustic Cryptanalysis: On Nosy People and Noisy
Machines, https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ec04rump/ [https://perma.cc/TAV3-5Z84] (May 4,
2004) (materials presented at the Eurocrypt 2004 rump session in Interlaken, Switzerland) (describing
how a CPU in the midst of particular computations may create auditory signatures that could be used to
decrypt secret keys).
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electromagnetic (EM) emissions,
cryptographic hardware’s power
18
consumption, and the time it takes a computer to execute a cryptographic
algorithm,19 to name a few examples.
One goal of cryptanalysis is for the cryptanalyst to determine the
cryptosystem’s secret key.20 The keys to encrypt devices and
communications differ. The keys to encrypt a device reside on the device
and do not leave it.21 For the encryption of communications, the keys to
encrypt a particular communication (“session keys”) are exchanged
between the two parties, but each party’s long-term identity key (which lets
the parties prove their identities to each other) stays on the device.22
A side-channel attack that allows the attacker to obtain the
cryptosystem’s secret encryption key is called a key-recovery attack23 or

17

See, e.g., KOEUNE, supra note 13. In 1985, Wim van Eck was the first to publish an
unclassified technical paper on EM side-channel attacks, specifically focusing on attacks against
computer monitors. See Wim van Eck, Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An
Eavesdropping Risk?, 4 COMPUT. & SEC. 269, 270 (1985) (discussing how it is “possible to reconstruct
the picture displayed on [a] video display unit from the radiated emission”). EM side-channel attacks
are therefore also called “van Eck phreaking,” though the term properly refers only to EM side-channel
attacks to reproduce the display of a monitor. CRAIG BAUER, SECRET HISTORY: THE STORY OF
CRYPTOLOGY 344 (2013).
18
See, e.g., Paul Kocher et al., Differential Power Analysis, 1999 INT’L ADVANCES IN
CRYPTOLOGY CONF. 2 (discussing SPA, a technique for collecting information about a device’s
cryptographic operations by directly interpreting power consumption measurements).
19
See, e.g., Paul C. Kocher, Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and
Other Systems, ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY – CRYPTO ’96 112–13 (1996) (available at
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F3-540-68697-5_9.pdf)
(“Implementation-specific
timing characteristics . . . can sometimes be used to compromise secret keys.”).
20
See JEAN-PHILIPPE AUMASSON, CRYPTANALYSIS VS. REALITY 1 (2011),
https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-11/Aumasson/bh-ad-11-Aumasson-CryptanalysisVSReality_WP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQ5Z-8SY2] (white paper delivered at the Black Hat Abu Dhabi 2011 conference).
21
See EDWARD W. FELTEN, NUTS AND BOLTS OF ENCRYPTION: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS
1–3 (2017), https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/encryption_primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6KCM788].
22
Id. at 3–4; see also, e.g., WHATSAPP, WHATSAPP ENCRYPTION OVERVIEW 4 (2016),
https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QBY45TQ] (“At no time does the WhatsApp server have access to any of the client’s private keys.”); Greg
Kumparak, Apple Explains Exactly How Secure iMessage Really Is, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is/
[https://perma.cc/E67K-S8XH] (explaining public/private key pairs in Apple iMessage and noting,
“Your private keys are stored on your device. Apple never sees your private keys.”); Digitally Signing
and Encrypting Messages – Mozilla Support, MOZILLA, https://support.mozilla.org/t5/Privacy-andsecurity-settings/Digitally-Signing-and-Encrypting-Messages/ta-p/16330
[https://perma.cc/3ZKFM2PG] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (explaining public-key cryptographic system used to encrypt email
messages and cautioning, “Never share your private key with anyone”); Rob Heaton, How Does
HTTPS Actually Work?, ROBERTHEATON (Mar. 27, 2014), http://robertheaton.com/2014/03/27/howdoes-https-actually-work/ [https://perma.cc/6R9D-8NW6] (explaining how web traffic is secured,
including public/private key pairs).
23
Key-Recovery Attack, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key-recovery_attack (last
visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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24

key-extraction attack. This Article focuses on electromagnetic sidechannel key-recovery attacks.25 In recent years, researchers “have
demonstrated that they can re[c]over the keys from the major types of
public key encryption in use today simply by picking up the radio waves
emanating from your laptop.”26 The Article examines whether law
enforcement can take advantage of that capability without legal process.
The latest public research on side-channel cryptanalysis has its roots in
World War II and the early Cold War era. During the war, the military
bought encryption devices that turned out to leak EM emissions that
allowed the recovery of plaintext from eighty feet away.27 In the 1950s, the
newly-created National Security Agency (NSA) tested its equipment and
realized that all of it radiated EM emissions.28 The agency took defensive
countermeasures and set specifications for shielding equipment from
spying.29 These so-called TEMPEST attacks are low-cost to conduct,30 but
expensive to defend against, as they are “non-trivial . . . and can require a
lot of special equipment.”31 Military standards for equipment shielding are
largely classified, which limits the academic and private sectors’
24

See Michael Byrne, PC Hardware Is Physically Leaking Your Encryption Keys, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2016, 9:14 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pc-hardware-isphysically-leaking-your-encryption-keys [https://perma.cc/U39F-VLCL] (using the term “key
extraction” synonymously with key recovery).
25
While this Article focuses on key-recovery attacks, the author hopes it provides a framework
for thinking through Fourth Amendment issues with respect to other varieties of side-channel attack as
well.
26
Alan Woodward, Crypto Key Recovery: Through Walls in Seconds, CYBER MATTERS (Feb. 15,
2016), https://www.profwoodward.org/2016/02/crypto-key-recovery-through-walls-in.html [https://
perma.cc/2VJ9-DF88]. For an overview of public-key cryptography, see Martin E. Hellman, An
Overview of Public Key Cryptography, IEEE COMMS. SOC’Y MAG., November 1978, at 24, 24–32,
https://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/31.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W97-3QUW] (discussing
the main purposes and challenges facing cryptography).
27
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, TEMPEST: A SIGNAL PROBLEM 27 (2007), https://www.nsa.gov/newsfeatures/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/assets/files/tempest.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ4KDAUH].
28
Johnson, supra note 2, at 221.
29
See BAUER, supra note 17, at 343 (“[V]arious countermeasures were taken to minimize the
distance at which emanations could be measured to reveal information.”). The countermeasures are
called TEMPEST (Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard), and while the term
technically refers only to defensive measures, side-channel attacks that exploit EM emanations are
commonly called “TEMPEST attacks.” Id.
30
van Eck, supra note 17, at 270. The attack van Eck described, against a cathode-ray tube (CRT)
monitor, required only a TV set and about $15 in additional equipment. Id. A more recent attack
against a liquid-crystal display (LCD) monitor allegedly cost less than $2,000 in equipment. See
BAUER, supra note 17, at 344 (citing Markus G. Kuhn, ELECTROMAGNETIC EAVESDROPPING RISKS OF
FLAT-PANEL DISPLAYS 23–25 (2004) [hereinafter Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks],
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7ZF-J387] (paper presented at
4th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Toronto, Can.).
31
BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 220
(2000).

1400

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1393
32

opportunities to come up with low-cost countermeasures.
Part of what makes TEMPEST attacks so costly to defend against is
that the issue affects all kinds of electronic equipment. Since “everything
radiate[s]” electromagnetic emissions,33 EM side-channel attacks are not
limited to monitors. “[E]verything leaks to some degree,” be it cell phones,
fax machines, computer switches, cables, power lines,34 or keyboards.35
EM side-channel attacks, while powerful, are currently of limited
utility “in the field.” A major concern for anyone conducting a sidechannel attack is being discovered by the target. The attacker must not be
detected—or at least, the target must not realize the attack is happening.
Because they involve measuring physical outputs such as EM emissions or
sound, side-channel attacks typically require placing the attacker’s sensing
equipment in close physical proximity to the system being attacked.36
EM attacks on monitors can work at enough of a distance to quell a
would-be attacker’s fears: hundreds of meters for old CRT monitors,37 and
ten38 to thirty meters39 for newer flat-screen displays.

32
MARKUS G. KUHN, COMPROMISING EMANATIONS: EAVESDROPPING RISKS OF COMPUTER
DISPLAYS
85–86
(2003),
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-577.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ7C-74A3] (“Secret ‘Tempest’ specification will not enjoy the continued quality
assurance offered by public scrutiny and open academic research. Such peer review and feedback has
led in the past repeatedly to significant improvements of technical standards, for example, in
cryptology, even where open research initially lags a decade or two behind the classified state of the
art.”).
33
Johnson, supra note 2, at 221.
34
SCHNEIER, supra note 31, at 220.
35
See Martin Vuagnoux & Sylvain Pasini, Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired
and Wireless Keyboards 1 (2009), https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec09/tech/full_papers/
vuagnoux.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HH3-3KRJ] (explaining that EM side-channel attacks on wired and
wireless keyboards allowed researchers to recover up to 95% of the keystrokes entered, meaning that
most modern computer keyboards “are not safe to transmit confidential information,” such as
passwords) (paper presented at 18th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium in Montreal, Can.).
36
See KUHN, supra note 32, at 133 (“Eavesdropping on unintended hardware emissions usually
requires a physical presence close to the target. This can lead to significant cost and risk of discovery
for the eavesdropper.”). Of course, proximity is unnecessary if the target transmits side-channel data
directly to the attacker—such as where the attacker can get the target to download and run malicious
code on an electronic device that “phones home” to the attacker with the data. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text. The legal requirements for law enforcement to do this are beyond the scope of this
Article. See infra notes 129, 133 and accompanying text.
37
van Eck, supra note 17, at 270–71 (stating that it is not possible to decrease the radiation from
the electron beam in the CRT).
38
See ELECTROMAGNETIC EAVESDROPPING RISKS, supra note 30, at 8 fig.3 (illustrating that text
is readable from ten meters away); see also Tom Simonite, Seeing Through Walls, NEW SCIENTIST
(Apr. 20, 2007, 6:59 PM), https://www.newscientist.com/blog/technology/2007/04/seeing-throughwalls.html [https://perma.cc/75VC-EKEY] (stating that Professor Kuhn reported successfully seeing
flat-panel displays from up to twenty-five meters away and claimed that he “was able to eavesdrop [on]
certain laptops through three walls”).
39
Michael Backes ET AL., COMPROMISING REFLECTIONS—OR—HOW TO READ LCD MONITORS
AROUND THE CORNER 1 (2008), http://gauss.ececs.uc.edu/Courses/c653/extra/reflections.pdf
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Side-channel key-extraction attacks in particular, however, typically
require far greater proximity. One recent EM key-extraction attack cleverly
fits the sensing equipment inside a piece of pita bread, but the attack is
effective only at distances of twenty centimeters to half a meter.40 The
same researchers also demonstrated an acoustic key-extraction attack
against laptops that works at a distance of four meters, so long as the
attacker uses a parabolic microphone; the attack can also be accomplished
using just a mobile phone, but with an effective distance of only thirty
centimeters.41 Likewise, the same team’s recently-published
electromagnetic key-extraction attack against an Apple iPhone required
“placing a magnetic probe in the proximity of the device.”42
The same (eerily prolific) team recently demonstrated an EM keyextraction attack against laptops that works by measuring, through a wall,
the EM leakage of a target laptop located in an adjacent room. 43 The attack
still requires proximity,44 but the wall provides coverage for the attacker
(and any conspicuous equipment) from discovery by the target.
TEMPEST-style attacks on displays may be more practical than other
varieties of electromagnetic side-channel attack,45 but key-recovery attacks
have their advantages. A TEMPEST attack, though feasible at greater

[https://perma.cc/GWH2-J3D8] (paper presented at 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy in
Oakland, Cal.).
40
DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., STEALING KEYS FROM PCS USING A RADIO: CHEAP
ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACKS ON WINDOWED EXPONENTIATION 14, 23 (2015) [hereinafter STEALING
KEYS FROM PCS], https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/radioexp.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA96-F327].
41
DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., RSA KEY EXTRACTION VIA LOW-BANDWIDTH ACOUSTIC
CRYPTANALYSIS
11–12,
27
(2014)
[hereinafter
RSA
KEY
EXTRACTION],
https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SH5-G9FP]. To
successfully conduct a key-extraction attack using a mobile phone that is limited to this thirtycentimeter range, the researchers envision a scenario wherein the attacker could “innocuously place his
phone on the desk next to the target laptop” during a meeting between target and attacker, “and obtain
the key by the meeting’s end.” Id. at 5–6, 27. It could pose a challenge for law enforcement agents to
carry out an “innocuous” encounter like this so close to a target, though it is not impossible.
42
DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., ECDSA KEY EXTRACTION FROM MOBILE DEVICES VIA NONINTRUSIVE
PHYSICAL
SIDE
CHANNELS
2
(2016)
[hereinafter
ECDSA
KEY
EXTRACTION],
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/230.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8FX-A2YY]. The team taped the probe to the
underside of a glass table atop which the iPhone was sitting. Id. at 3.
43
DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., ECDH KEY-EXTRACTION VIA LOW-BANDWIDTH ELECTROMAGNETIC
ATTACKS
ON
PCS
11
(2016)
[hereinafter
ECDH
KEY-EXTRACTION],
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHW2-F43N]. The researchers were able “to
extract the whole secret key by monitoring the target’s electromagnetic (EM) field for just a few
seconds.” Id. at 2.
44
See id. at 11 (explaining that the sensing equipment is placed right on the opposite side of the
wall from the laptop, preferably closest to the spot on the laptop that yields the best signal quality).
45
See KUHN, supra note 32, at 133 (“Compared to the large number of minor and highly
theoretical vulnerabilities of cryptographic primitives and protocols discussed in much of the current
computer security literature, compromising emanations are a risk of practical interest . . . .”).
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distances, only lets the attacker “see” whatever the target happens to
display on his monitor. Obtaining the target’s secret encryption keys
unlocks the door to a much greater cache of information.
In sum, side-channel key-recovery attacks can be a powerful way to
circumvent a target’s use of encryption and gain access to his records in
plaintext. However, they will remain limited in investigatory utility until
they can work at greater distances and with discreet equipment. The next
Section discusses why law enforcement may nevertheless need to deploy
such attacks in the future, regardless of their drawbacks.
II. ENCRYPTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
A. Encryption Is Growing in Popular Use (at Last)
Encryption started out being too important to let just anybody use it.
But in the digital age, it has become too important for anybody not to use
it. We rely on encryption to secure our communications,47 medical records,
banking records, financial transactions,48 business secrets, intellectual
property, and national security.49 Nowadays, just about everybody gets to
have encryption, and consumer-oriented encryption software is finally
making some progress in overcoming its longstanding usability problems.
Secret writing50 goes back centuries, yet despite its long and
distinguished history in warfare, intelligence,51 and statecraft,52
46
See ELECTROMAGNETIC EAVESDROPPING RISKS, supra note 30, at 8 fig.3 (stating that text is
readable from ten meters away through three walls).
47
See Easy Guide to Encryption and Why It Matters, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 21, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/10/easy-guide-to-encryption-and-why-it-matters/
[https://perma.cc/H9EM-XLQL] (stating that people use encryption to prevent their text messages,
emails, phone calls, and video chats from being accessed by people other than the intended recipient).
48
Ann Cavoukian, Encryption Is Crucial to Our Privacy and Freedom, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 9,
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/encryption-is-crucial-to-our-privacy-andfreedom/article27652852/ [https://perma.cc/2EMB-HQLK].
49
Susan Landau, The National-Security Needs for Ubiquitous Encryption, in BERKMAN CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. UNIV., DON’T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK”
DEBATE app. A 1–3 (2016).
50
See Cryptography, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
cryptography [https://perma.cc/ZL6H-8NB6] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (“The word traces back to the
Greek roots kryptos, meaning ‘hidden,’ and graphein, meaning ‘to write.’”); Cryptography, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45374 [https://perma.cc/Y55W-YPF3] (last
visited Feb. 6, 2017).
51
The Allies’ compromise of both the Nazis’ and Japanese’s encryption schemes played an
important role in the outcome of World War II. See Thinh Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls,
and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
667, 668 (1997) (explaining how breaking the Enigma code helped the Allies sink German U-boats and
obtain information about military operations, and similar code-breaking helped the United States Navy
intercept the Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway).
52
Julius Caesar used a cipher to protect his confidential writings. See SUETONIUS, THE CAESARS
100 (Donna W. Hurley trans., 2011) (“And whenever he writes in code, he substitutes B for A, C for B,
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cryptography has only come into widespread use by laypeople relatively
recently. For many years, the NSA jealously guarded all information about
crypto and hindered its dissemination in the civilian sphere.53 That changed
with the rise of the Internet in the late twentieth century, following a
pitched battle in the courts and Congress. The history of the so-called
“Crypto Wars” of the 1990s has been amply documented already and need
not be revisited here.54 Suffice it to say that as of this writing, in the United
States, it is legal as a general matter to teach cryptography55 and to sell
encryption software and cryptographic equipment (albeit with some
restrictions on exports).56
It took a while for average Americans to show much enthusiasm for
this hard-won outcome. But they cannot be faulted for that. Encryption has
contributed for years to the ongoing tension between security and
usability.57 Commercial, off-the-shelf encryption software has long been
notoriously user-unfriendly,58 difficult to configure properly, and clunky to
and the rest of the letters that follow in the same plan.”). Also, the Founding Fathers encoded their
letters discussing an early draft of the First Amendment. See John A. Fraser, III, The Use of Encrypted,
Coded and Secret Communications Is an “Ancient Liberty” Protected by the United States
Constitution, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (1997) (describing how correspondence between Jefferson and
Madison concerning comments to the First Amendment consisted of partially enciphered text).
53
STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT—SAVING PRIVACY
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 13–15 (2001) (describing how “all the salient information about modern crypto
was withheld from public view” by the shadowy NSA, which “considered itself the sole repository of
cryptographic information in the country—not just that used by the civilian government and all the
armed forces, . . . but that used by the private sector as well”).
54
Id. This source is an excellent, readable account of the Crypto Wars that is accessible to those
without a mathematical or scientific background (such as the author, and the non-negligible segment of
the legal community that decided to go to law school because there is no math on the LSAT).
55
See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (challenging then-current export
restrictions on encryption software, likewise holding encryption software source code to be First
Amendment-protected speech, in case brought by a professor who wished to disseminate encryption
software source code as part of a course on computers and the law); see also Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling, in narrow holding, that software source code is speech
protected by the First Amendment, and that government regulations unconstitutionally prevented
publication of cryptographic source code which plaintiff Daniel Bernstein wanted to publish while a
student at the University of California, Berkeley), reh’g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn, 192
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
56
Commerce Control List, 82 Fed. Reg. 38769, 38799–802 (Aug. 15, 2017) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. § 774.1).
57
See, e.g., SCOTT RUOTI ET AL., WHY JOHNNY STILL, STILL CAN’T ENCRYPT: EVALUATING THE
USABILITY OF A MODERN PGP CLIENT (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1510.08555v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KF5-C4CY] (reporting results of a usability study of the encrypted email client
Mailvelope, with the majority of study participants finding it difficult to use and almost none of the
participants being able to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them, thus leading to the
conclusion that “[u]sable, secure email is still an open problem more than 15 years after it was first
studied”).
58
“For encryption to help most citizens, it has to be usable. It often is not.” Calo, supra note 6, at
37. See, e.g., Alma Whitten & J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP
5.0, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN USE 679, 699
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use. Unsurprisingly, because “encryption was typically cumbersome” in
the past, “its use [was] rare.”60
In recent years, developers have finally started to make “usable
security” a visible priority. Companies such as Apple, Facebook, and
Google have implemented strong encryption into their products and
services, in some instances turning encryption features on by default.61
“Defaulting to encryption” is preferable to making users configure their
settings, because “something that is already turned on need not be usable,
and most people stick with defaults, making encryption widespread.”62
For communications security, Apple uses default “end-to-end”
encryption in its iMessage messaging app and FaceTime video call app,63
meaning the two interlocutors can read the messages they exchange, but
eavesdroppers cannot read any intercepted plaintext—and neither can
Apple.64 Open Whisper Systems’ free Signal app for text messages and
voice calls is also end-to-end encrypted by default.65 Facebook-owned
WhatsApp now uses Signal’s encryption protocol to encrypt messages,
voice calls, and video calls end-to-end by default.66 End-to-end encryption
for email remains a thorny challenge, however—Google and Yahoo
(Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005) (reporting the dismal results of a usability
assessment of version 5 of Pretty Good Privacy [PGP], a tool for encrypting email).
59
Whitten & Tygar, supra note 58, at 680.
60
Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), at
*4 (citations to draft dated Mar. 20, 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938033 [https://perma.cc/K6DM-LH57]).
61
See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), at
*32 (citations to draft dated Mar. 17, 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2935321 [https://perma.cc/E8WB-RQWH]). Rozenshtein claims that “regular
Internet users don’t use PGP and Tor because both systems are difficult to use.” Id. (citing Whitten &
Tygar, supra note 58; further citations omitted). He lays this problem at the feet of “open-source
developers [who] lack the resources and organization to make them sufficiently user-friendly for
widespread use,” whereas large companies like Apple and WhatsApp “have the money and talent,” as
well as “legal and social clout,” “to build end-to-end encryption into their services so seamlessly that
users communicate securely without even realizing it.” Id.
62
Calo, supra note 6, at 39; see also Rozenshtein, supra note 61, at *33 (“the vast majority of
users never bother to change those (or any other) default settings”) (citation omitted).
63
Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/JA96-UWJ7] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
64
Id. (“Apple has no way to decrypt iMessage and FaceTime data when it’s in transit between
devices. So unlike other companies’ messaging services, Apple doesn’t scan your communications, and
we wouldn’t be able to comply with a wiretap order even if we wanted to.”).
65
OPEN WHISPER SYSTEMS, https://whispersystems.org/ [https://perma.cc/S3W5-6J5X] (last
visited Feb. 7, 2016) (“We cannot read your messages, and no one else can either. Everything is always
end-to-end encrypted and painstakingly engineered in order to keep your communication safe.”).
66
Cade Metz, Forget Apple vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion
People, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbiwhatsapp-just-switched-encryption-billion-people/; Martin Shelton, Upgrading WhatsApp Security,
MEDIUM
(Feb.
6,
2017),
https://medium.com/@mshelton/upgrading-whatsapp-security386c8ce496d3#.ze0z63ifv [https://perma.cc/9BKP-72AM].
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encrypt email messages in transit between user and server, but have yet to
roll out end-to-end encryption despite years of effort.68
The trend of improved encryption offerings extends to the encryption
of data at rest as well. Apple encrypts iPhones and iPads by default; in fact,
it does not allow users to disable device decryption.69 Mobile phones
running Google’s Android mobile operating system can also be encrypted,
although Android device encryption rates have lagged far behind iPhone’s
for several reasons.70 Those challenges have hampered Google’s efforts to
turn on default device encryption.71
Beyond smartphones, there are also options for encrypting data stored
on computers and in the cloud. Disk encryption is available for Apple,
Microsoft, and Linux operating systems,72 though Apple and Microsoft do
not turn this feature on by default.73 Finally, while they face their own set
67

Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
saferemail/faq/ [https://perma.cc/8PV6-9BSE] (last visited Feb. 7, 2016); Steven Musil, Yahoo Enables
Default HTTPS Encryption for Yahoo Mail, CNET (Jan. 7, 2014, 7:48 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/yahoo-enables-default-https-encryption-for-yahoo-mail/
[https://perma.cc/V2N5-BQ52]. Relatedly, as of early 2017, around half of all Internet traffic is now
encrypted, which provides security and privacy benefits to Internet users without demanding any
affirmative measures on their part. Klint Finley, Half the Web Is Now Encrypted. That Makes Everyone
Safer, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2017, 8:54 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/half-web-now-encryptedmakes-everyone-safer/ [https://perma.cc/5T47-6Q7H].
68
Andy Greenberg, After 3 Years, Why Gmail’s End-to-End Encryption Is Still Vapor, WIRED
(Feb. 28, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/3-years-gmails-end-end-encryption-stillvapor/ [https://perma.cc/D3YT-79TE]; Wendy Lee, Yahoo, Google Still Working on End-to-End
Encryption
for
Email,
S.F.
CHRON.
(Jan.
21,
2017,
3:02
PM),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Yahoo-Google-still-working-on-end-to-end-10872573.php
[https://perma.cc/TW4B-AEV4].
69
APPLE,
IOS
SECURITY:
IOS
9.3
OR
LATER
4
(2016),
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZD7-A2AW].
70
Andrew Cunningham, Why Are so Few Android Phones Encrypted, and Should You Encrypt
Yours?, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:54 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/03/why-areso-few-android-phones-encrypted-and-should-you-encrypt-yours/ [https://perma.cc/LU9D-CDQR].
71
Kaveh Waddell, Encryption Is a Luxury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/the-digital-security-divide/475590/
[https://perma.cc/Q5N8-DQU5]. The gap between iPhone and Android perpetuates a “digital divide”
along race and class lines: users of expensive iPhones tend to be well-educated and high earners,
whereas less-costly Android phones, which have a majority market share, are primarily used by lowincome people and African-Americans—the very segments of the population most heavily surveilled
by the government. Id.
72
See Micah Lee, Encrypting Your Laptop Like You Mean It, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 27, 2015,
10:36 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/04/27/encrypting-laptop-like-mean/ [https://perma.cc/LWP2FCF9] (providing a step-by-step how-to guide for various operating systems).
73
How to Enable Full-Disk Encryption on Windows 10, HOW-TO GEEK,
http://www.howtogeek.com/234826/how-to-enable-full-disk-encryption-on-windows-10/
[https://perma.cc/5K65-58AC] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017); Turn on Device Encryption, MICROSOFT,
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/instantanswers/e7d75dd2-29c2-16ac-f03d-20cfdf54202f/turn-ondevice-encryption [https://perma.cc/M6U9-NJF3] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017); Use FileVault to Encrypt
the Startup
Disk on
Your Mac, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837
[https://perma.cc/P45E-A9JA] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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74

of challenges when it comes to encryption, cloud storage providers such
as Dropbox and Box encrypt users’ files at rest in the cloud.75
Encryption tools are still far from perfect when it comes to usability76
and “defaulting to encryption.” And tradeoffs that favor either greater
security or greater usability are an unavoidable part of life.77 Nevertheless,
the welcome trend in crypto implementation by major U.S. companies with
massive user bases means that hundreds of millions of people in the U.S.
and worldwide finally have some fairly usable ways to protect their
communications and stored data.
B. “Going Dark” and Novel Forms of Electronic Evidence-Gathering
The rise in communications and device encryption is a boon for user
security. Law enforcement, however, has responded with dismay.
Encryption makes information-gathering more difficult for law
enforcement, and the more prevalent it becomes, the more that challenge
grows. It is not clear that the problem is as serious as the authorities claim,
particularly given the many sources of information still available to them.
Nevertheless, law enforcement has been exploring other options, both legal
and technological, for maintaining their surveillance capabilities as
encryption grows ever more ubiquitous.
1. “Going Dark”? Or . . .
Encryption does not just keep hackers and criminals from accessing
someone’s data; it can stymie law enforcement, too. Even if investigators
obtain proper legal process to intercept communications in transit or to
access data at rest, encryption poses a technological barrier to carrying out

74
See Thomas Ristenpart, There’s No One Perfect Method for Encryption in the Cloud, DARK
READING (Jan. 26, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/cloud/theres-no-one-perfectmethod-for-encryption-in-the-cloud/a/d-id/1327972 [https://perma.cc/U5ZA-XB99] (explaining the
challenges cloud technology faces with encryption).
75
Box KeySafe: Encryption Key Management, BOX, https://www.box.com/security/keysafe
[https://perma.cc/PSE5-T8NK]
(last
visited
Sept.
8,
2017);
Security,
DROPBOX,
https://www.dropbox.com/security [https://perma.cc/5P69-P265] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
76
See, e.g., Jonathan Geater, Why Johnny STILL Can’t Encrypt (Feb. 17, 2017) (presentation
given at RSA Conference in San Francisco, Cal.) (abstract and recording of presentation available at
https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17/agenda/sessions/6352-why-johnny-still-cant-encrypt
[https://perma.cc/TT22-ZZ8N]) (arguing that the application program interfaces (APIs) for encryption
tools are what need to be fixed, not users).
77
Renowned computer security expert Bruce Schneier has criticized the “‘either/or’ thinking” of
“security and usability as a trade-off[,]” wherein “a more secure system is less functional and more
annoying, and a more capable, flexible, and powerful system is less secure.” This mindset, he says,
perversely leads to “systems that are neither usable nor secure.” Bruce Schneier, Security Design: Stop
Trying to Fix the User, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Oct. 3, 2016, 6:12 AM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/10/security_design.html [https://perma.cc/E38K-KN4J].
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78

the order. Law enforcement calls this issue “going dark”: criminals and
terrorists will use encryption to cloak their activities from police eyes.79
Law enforcement officials have been sounding warnings about
encryption for over twenty years.80 When the issue first arose in the 1990s,
the “going dark” battle in the Crypto Wars culminated in a compromise.81
Since 1994, the federal Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) has required telecommunications carriers to make their
systems wiretappable for law enforcement so that Americans’ phone calls
do not “go dark.”82 However, carriers may provide encryption and need not
maintain decryption capabilities.83 “Information services” (understood
originally to mean Internet-related businesses and companies that set up
operations online) are not included in the access mandate, meaning “[t]he
Internet was completely exempted” from CALEA’s coverage.84
These exceptions were less consequential in practical effect when
CALEA was first enacted than they are today. As noted, encryption
software was persistently user-unfriendly for a long time, so it
understandably did not come into widespread use in the early years
following CALEA’s passage. Between the guaranteed wiretappability of
phone calls and the limited public adoption of encryption software, law
enforcement’s “going dark” nightmare future failed to materialize.
In recent years, however, CALEA’s “information services” exemption
has taken on greater significance. “Information services” include email
providers, messaging apps, social media services, and computer and
smartphone manufacturers.85 Providers of those services have taken
advantage of their legal freedom to offer encrypted consumer-oriented
products and services. Now, with advances in user-friendliness and either
ready availability or default implementation in many popular devices and
78

Going Dark, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/operationaltechnology/going-dark [https://perma.cc/T95C-AYRL] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
79
Id.
80
Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/JW9Y-X4SS] (“Law-enforcement and intelligence agencies contend that if strong
[cryptographic] codes are widely available, their efforts to protect the public would be paralyzed. . . . If
cryptography is not controlled, wiretapping could be rendered obsolete.”).
81
Eric Geller, The Rise of the New Crypto War, DAILY DOT (July 10, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/encryption-crypto-war-james-comey-fbi-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/D44E-JMUE].
82
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012).
83
Id. § 1002(b)(3); see also Albert Gidari, CALEA Limits the All Writs Act and Protects the
Security of Apple’s Phones, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Feb. 19, 2016, 6:26 PM),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/02/calea-limits-all-writs-act-and-protects-security-applesphones [https://perma.cc/3HJ7-RUKL].
84
47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2); Geller, supra note 81.
85
See Geller, supra note 81 (defining “information services” and showcasing how many modern
features of internet communication are exempt).
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services, encryption protects millions of people’s communications,
devices, and stored records.86 The upshot is that law enforcement can no
longer expect reliable, easy access to the plaintext contents of electronic
communications and stored data of people they investigate or prosecute.87
As encryption has finally become widespread, law enforcement
officials have revived their anti-encryption arguments from the 1990s. The
FBI renewed its warnings to the public in 2008 (when the phrase “going
dark” appears to have been coined),88 and continued beating the drum in
testimony to legislators over the next few years, even drafting legislation
that would have closed the CALEA “information services” exemption.89
Proponents of the “going dark” viewpoint found new cause for alarm
in late 2014. Apple and Google announced that they were reworking the
encryption in their respective mobile operating systems, such that they
would no longer have the capability they had previously maintained to
extract data from passcode-locked devices for police—even with a
warrant.90 The law enforcement community swiftly condemned these
changes.91 The FBI’s director said the two companies were “allow[ing]
people to place themselves beyond the law.”92 Manhattan’s district
86

See supra Section II.A.
See Going Dark, supra note 78 (discussing how the growing encryption of web traffic makes it
harder for police to eavesdrop on a target’s online activities); see also Finley, supra note 67 (discussing
how the rise of HTTPS has hampered law enforcement’s ability to eavesdrop on Internet traffic).
88
Eric Geller, A Complete Guide to the New “Crypto Wars”, DAILY DOT (Apr. 26, 2016, 9:50
AM),
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/encryption-crypto-wars-backdoors-timeline-security-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/FJP2-NQT6].
89
Id.; see also Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law
Enforcement Get What It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.
L. & TECH. 599, 621 (2016) (relating former FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni’s concerns about
the future of law enforcement); Declan McCullagh, FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now,
CNET (May 4, 2012, 9:24 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sitesnow/ [https://perma.cc/XV52-8NBV].
90
APPLE INC., LEGAL PROCESS GUIDELINES: U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (2015),
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y22FVQU8] (“[U]pon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can
extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices . . . running iOS 4 through
iOS 7, [such as] SMS, iMessage, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history.
Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party app data.”); Craig Timberg, Apple
Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search Warrants, WASH. POST
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed211e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html [https://perma.cc/N8YJ-343U]; Craig Timberg, Newest Androids
Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphonesin-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/ [https://perma.cc/LKR8-27MW].
91
See Timberg, supra note 90 (referencing comments by the former head of the FBI’s criminal
investigative division on how default encryption is “problematic”).
92
Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police out of Phones,
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/
09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa 0153527_story.html [https://perma.cc/3MH8-NSWA].
87
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attorney published a heated op-ed in the Washington Post, claiming that
the changes gave free rein to criminals and calling for congressional action
if Apple and Google did not reverse them.93 To date, however, encryption
continues to make gains, with no sign of retreat.94
2. . . . A “Golden Age of Surveillance”?
Although it recognizes encryption’s importance to people’s privacy
and security, law enforcement nonetheless perceives encryption as a
serious threat to its ability to do its job.95 What is not clear is whether the
going dark “problem” is as big a threat as law enforcement claims. To
critics of “going dark,” law enforcement is in a “golden age” of electronic
surveillance that makes a wealth of data available to investigators
notwithstanding encryption.
One point critics note is law enforcement’s reliance on anecdotes and
incomplete data. Officials cite individual instances of deplorable crimes for
which investigators could not unlock smartphones that might contain
evidence,96 without contextualizing the rarity of the “worst of the worst”
crimes compared to run-of-the-mill offenses.97 Likewise, reporting in
isolation the number of smartphones prosecutors have in custody but

93

Cyrus R. Vance Jr., Apple and Google Threaten Public Safety with Default Smartphone
Encryption, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/apple-andgoogle-threaten-public-safety-with-default-smartphone-encryption/2014/09/25/43af9bf0-44ab-11e4b437-1a7368204804_story.html [https://perma.cc/3N7P-N8VG].
94
See, e.g., Finley, supra note 67 (noting that at least half of all web traffic is encrypted); Metz,
supra note 66 (discussing the ongoing implementation of end-to-end encryption into WhatsApp).
95
Deciphering the Debate Over Encryption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Amy Hess,
Exec. Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/decipheringthe-debate-over-encryption [https://perma.cc/4FAU-5YGQ].
96
See, e.g., MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 9 (2015) [hereinafter DA
2015
REPORT],
http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/11.18.15%20Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%
20and%20Public%20Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XNA-2W5Z] (stating that prosecutors were unable
to access smartphones in cases involving “homicide, attempted murder, sexual abuse of a child, sex
trafficking, assault, and robbery”); Peter Holley, A Locked iPhone May Be the Only Thing Standing
Between
Police
and
This
Woman’s
Killer,
WASH. POST
(Feb.
26,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/26/a-locked-iphone-may-be-the-onlything-standing-between-police-and-this-womans-killer/ [https://perma.cc/JT9Z-XPD6] (prosecutors
sought to access the locked iPhone of a murdered pregnant woman).
97
See Riana Pfefferkorn, James Comey’s Default-Encryption Bogeyman, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 15,
2016,
12:15
PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/28832/comeys-default-encryption-bogeyman/
[https://perma.cc/D682-AN8Z] (discussing how law enforcement’s public statements regarding “going
dark” focus on how encryption helps criminals engaged in murders and sex crimes, when in reality the
typical cases in which law enforcement is likely to encounter encryption are probably low-level drug
offenses).
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98

cannot unlock leaves out a crucial question: do prosecutors obtain
convictions in those cases anyway?99 It appears they often do.100 If law
enforcement can still successfully prosecute cases despite encryption, then
the “going dark” issue is not (yet) as consequential as claimed.101
The fact that an individual’s devices or communications are encrypted
does not leave police empty-handed. Even with the growing ubiquity of
encryption, numerous sources of metadata, and even content information,
are still available to investigators through the usual channels of legal
process.102 Professor Peter Swire coined the phrase “golden age of
surveillance” to describe the sea of data law enforcement can now access,
such as where people have been, who they know, and “databases that
create digital dossiers about individuals’ lives.”103 These “massive gains,”
he argues, have “more than offset” the losses attributable to encryption.104
There is some evidence to support his contention. Encryption appears
not to have significantly hindered wiretaps yet.105 Also, law enforcement
98

Compare DA 2015 REPORT, supra note, at 96 (reporting that in a one-year period from
September 2014 through September 2015, the DA’s office was unable to execute approximately 111
search warrants for smartphones running iOS 8, which Apple cannot decrypt for law enforcement),
with The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Cyrus R. Vance Jr., Dist. Attorney for New
York County), http://manhattanda.org/written-testimony-manhattan-da-cyrus-r-vance-jr-encryptiontightrope-balancing-americans-security-an [https://perma.cc/D3EY-98WR] (reporting that the 111
devices number had risen to 175, out of approximately 670 Apple devices in office’s custody), and
MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY: AN UPDATE TO THE NOVEMBER 2015 REPORT 9
(2016),
http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%
20and%20Public%20Safety:%20An%20Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QTG-8TF7] (reporting that the
office was “locked out” of around 42% of smartphones taken into office’s custody in a three-month
period in 2016).
99
See Pfefferkorn, supra note 97 (stating that the DA 2015 REPORT does not mention “whether
prosecutors successfully pursued those cases using other evidence; the total number of search warrants
issued for smartphones during the period cited; how many of those devices turned out to be encrypted;
and of those, how many warrants were successfully executed nevertheless.”).
100
Patrick Howell O’Neill, Exclusive FOIA Documents Reveal 7 Cases in New York DA’s
iPhone-Unlocking
Push,
DAILY
DOT
(Apr.
14,
2016,
8:57
AM),
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/iphone-encryption-manhattan-da-vance-foia/ [https://perma.cc/T2WCSUKS].
101
Encryption’s impact on law enforcement will shift over time, but it is too early to tell how.
Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 41.
102
See Peter Swire, The Golden Age of Surveillance, SLATE (July 15, 2015, 4:12 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/07/encryption_back_doors_aren_t_necessa
ry_we_re_already_in_a_golden_age_of.html [https://perma.cc/MEP2-LF6G] (discussing how the use
of metadata and location information is available to law enforcement agencies, and that encryption
need not be weakened to give those agencies tools to fight crime).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping
on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 14–15 & 14–15 nn.59–60 (2014) (analyzing
federal wiretap reporting data showing very few wiretaps where investigators encountered encryption
and concluding that law enforcement will rarely have to resort to unusual methods in order to carry out
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can still access the plaintext contents of most text messages sent, despite
the growing popularity of encrypted messaging apps.106 The prevalence of
Android phones may account for this. Over half of U.S. smartphones are
Android phones,107 whose default messaging option is not encrypted endto-end.108 Most people do not change defaults,109 so a significant
percentage of Android users’ (and, given Android’s market share, the
general public’s) text messages will still be accessible by law enforcement.
The same goes for device encryption, since most Android devices are not
encrypted by default.110 In short, Android’s market dominance and defaults
likely mitigate encryption’s impact on law enforcement.111
Even where the plaintext contents of messages cannot be intercepted—
and we know of a few cases where WhatsApp112 and iMessage113
encryption supposedly stymied wiretap orders—metadata about the
messages typically remains available from the provider (with Signal a
notable exception).114 Metadata is highly useful in law enforcement

Title III wiretaps); see also Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Feds and Cops Encountered Encryption in
Only 13 Wiretaps in 2015, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (June 30, 2016 1:30 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wiretap-report-feds-and-cops-encountered-encryption-inonly-13-wiretaps-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/9Z3S-KMJN] (“Once again, for the second straight year,
the number of times [that] state or federal wiretaps [] encountered encryption, decreased . . . .”). But see
Bellovin et al., supra, at 105 (“Even if law enforcement does not currently have a serious problem in
conducting authorized wiretaps, with time it will.”).
106
Swire, supra note 102.
107
Waddell, supra note 71.
108
Id.
109
Calo, supra note 6, at 39.
110
Cunningham, supra note 70.
111
What is more, the groups most likely to be targeted for surveillance are the very people who
tend to use Android phones, Waddell, supra note 71—meaning the choice of whom to surveil helps
predict the (un)likelihood of encountering encryption when doing so.
112
See Matt Apuzzo, WhatsApp Encryption Said to Stymie Wiretap Order, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/us/politics/whatsapp-encryption-said-to-stymie-wiretaporder.html?_r=0 (“No decision has been made, but a court fight with WhatsApp, the world’s largest
mobile messaging service, would open a new front in the Obama administration’s dispute with Silicon
Valley over encryption, security and privacy.”).
113
See Matt Apuzzo, David E. Sanger, & Michael S. Schmidt, Apple and Other Tech Companies
Tangle with U.S. Over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to-data.html
(reporting “several” cases in which Apple “rebuffed” iMessage wiretap requests). The Department of
Justice (DOJ) reportedly shelved the idea of taking Apple to court over its inability to comply. Id.
114
Swire, supra note 102. Apple and WhatsApp retain messaging metadata, which they produce
to law enforcement pursuant to valid legal process; Apple has even disclosed the phone numbers to
which an iMessage user started composing an ultimately unsent message. Sam Biddle, Apple Logs
Your iMessage Contacts—And May Share Them with Police, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/09/28/apple-logs-your-imessage-contacts-and-may-share-themwith-police/. Signal, by contrast, retains minimal metadata; in response to a subpoena, it can disclose
only the time an account was created and the account’s date of last connection to Signal’s servers.
Cyrus Farivar, FBI Demands Signal User Data, But There’s Not Much to Hand Over, ARS TECHNICA
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investigations because it “leaves traces of every electronic communication
a suspect has, showing whom they speak to, how often, how long, and
from where,”115 allowing investigators to reconstruct a detailed picture of
an individual’s activities and contacts (and their activities and contacts).116
Access to metadata is not a 100% replacement for access to content, but it
remains a powerful tool for law enforcement investigations.
For content information, police can turn to remote storage sources in
lieu of intercepts or seizures of data from encrypted devices.117 Professor
Swire argued several years ago that encryption was prompting a shift in
law enforcement strategy from real-time intercepts of data, which were
becoming more likely to be encrypted in transit, to seeking stored data,
especially in the cloud.118 Cloud storage services’ encryption practices do
not necessarily preclude them from compliance with government requests
for content information.119 WhatsApp lets users back up their messages,
but stores them in a form that is readable by WhatsApp (and thus by law
enforcement).120 The same is true of Signal backups.121 Apple encrypts user
data stored in iCloud,122 but it can, and does, disclose iCloud-stored user
(Oct. 4, 2016, 1:29 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/10/fbi-demands-signal-user-databut-theres-not-much-to-hand-over/ [http://perma.cc/RS6J-4BW9].
115
Swire, supra note 102.
116
See Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with Metadata?, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whats-the-matter-with-metadata [https://perma.cc/D9CBJ6SW] (quoting security expert and Don’t Panic co-author Susan Landau as saying that metadata is
“much more intrusive than content”; armed with communications metadata, investigators “know
exactly what is happening—[they] don’t need the content”).
117
See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 2829 (discussing options available within the
“locate a plaintext copy” category of encryption workarounds and setting forth the necessary
requirements for the search to succeed).
118
Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why Encryption Drives the
Government to Seek Access to the Cloud, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 200, 20203 (2012),
https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ips025 [https://perma.cc/8RPS-S4J4] (noting that despite previous low
adoption rates, “widespread encryption adoption is well under way for email and voice
communications” and given obstacles encryption poses to other means of access, “agencies will thus
increasingly depend on access to stored records, notably those stored in the cloud”).
119
See, e.g., DROPBOX, 2016 TRANSPARENCY REPORT: JANUARY TO JUNE 2016 (2016),
https://www.dropbox.com/transparency/?_tk=mb&_camp=news&_ad=transparency-h12016&_net=trans-prin [https://perma.cc/B376-9XRF] (reporting that in the six-month period from
January to June 2016, Dropbox provided content information for 467 accounts pursuant to 328 search
warrants).
120
See Shelton, supra note 66 (noting that WhatsApp allows users to back up their media and
messages to the cloud, but the data is not protected by WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption while in
Google Drive or while in iCloud).
121
See Masha Kolenkina, How Do I Import or Export Messages?, SIGNAL SUPPORT,
https://support.whispersystems.org/hc/en-us/articles/212535828-How-do-I-import-or-export-messages[https://perma.cc/8Z3U-9E7P] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) (noting that “exported Signal messages will
not be encrypted and are stored as plaintext”).
122
See iCloud Security and Privacy Overview, APPLE SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/enus/HT202303 [https://perma.cc/6EHT-7NEG] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) (stating that “iCloud secures
your information by encrypting it when it’s sent over the Internet”).
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information (which can include numerous categories of data) to law
enforcement.123 Android users can back up their data to Google Drive (if
their phone model supports it), where the backups are accessible to law
enforcement with a warrant.124 In short, the rise of cloud storage has
mitigated the effects on law enforcement investigations of the concurrent
rise of device and messaging encryption.
Other sources of information with considerable potential for law
enforcement use are the Internet of Things (IoT) and existing
vulnerabilities in consumer software and hardware.125 The new
technologies that make our lives more convenient can also make us easier
to surveil—for example, by turning the on-board driver assistance system
in our cars into a roving wiretap,126 or monitoring our homes through an
IoT-connected device.127 The burgeoning IoT opens up a whole new world
123

See Brian Barrett, How Apple Could Make Your iPhone and Mac Even More Secure, WIRED
(June 10, 2016, 6:59 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/apple-security-improvements/
[https://perma.cc/BF7Y-GASX] (noting that Apple often “hand[s] over data to law enforcement when
asked” and can do so because “while iCloud backups are encrypted, Apple maintains a copy of the
keys”); Andy Greenberg, Two Tips to Keep Your Phone’s Encrypted Messages Encrypted, WIRED
(Apr. 26, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/tips-for-encrypted-messages/
[https://perma.cc/GL3X-BBQE] (noting that messages backed up to Apple’s iCloud servers are “open
to all the usual risks of exposure to hackers, to Apple . . . or to any government that can force those
companies to turn over the data”); APPLE, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REQUESTS:
JANUARY 1–JUNE 30, 2016 (2016), https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/transparency/requests-2016H1-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YCX-KJW9] (stating that the company will “provide customers’ iCloud
content, which may include stored photos, email, iOS device backups, documents, contacts, calendars,
and bookmarks” in response to a search warrant).
124
See Jason Cipriani, What You Need to Know about Encryption on Your Phone, CNET (Mar.
10,
2016,
5:00
AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/iphone-android-encryption-fbi/
[https://perma.cc/65HL-J29J] (“As with Apple’s iCloud Backup practices, data within a backup stored
on Google’s serves is accessible by the company when presented with a warrant by law enforcement”).
125
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is a “network of internet-connected objects able to collect and
exchange data using embedded sensors.” It specifically “refers to the connection of devices (other than
typical fare such as computers and smartphones) to the Internet, including “[c]ars, kitchen appliances,
and even heart monitors.” See Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, BUS. INSIDER
(Dec. 19, 2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-internet-of-things-definition2016-8 [https://perma.cc/AMT8-UTCL] (explaining the Internet of Things and providing a glossary of
terms and basic definitions).
126
This idea dates back at least fifteen years, to when the FBI sought to use a vehicle’s on-board
driver-assistance system “as a roving ‘bug.’” Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132, 113334 (9th
Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that a provision of the Wiretap Act
required the service provider to comply with court orders compelling the provider’s assistance, because
“FBI surveillance completely disabled the monitored car’s [s]ystem,” in violation of the Wiretap Act’s
requirement that any technical assistance must be “accomplish[ed] . . . with a minimum of interference”
to the service provided. Id. at 114547; 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (describing the requirements for an
“order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication” and
indicating that such an order must be accomplished “unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference”).
127
See URS GASSER ET AL., THE BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIV.,
DON’T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 1315 (2016),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-
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of audio, video, and metadata that can be repurposed from consumer to law
enforcement use, “as long as [such uses] are appropriately authorized,
resourced, and overseen.”128
Surveillance through the IoT will repurpose intentional features of IoT
devices. Law enforcement also exploits bugs—unintentional flaws—in
commercial software products. The government has been exploiting
software vulnerabilities to catch suspected criminals for most of this
century.129 Recently, the government evidently exploited a browser
vulnerability to hack over a thousand computers on the basis of a single
warrant.130 “[G]overnment hacking can raise complex legal questions
under the Fourth Amendment and other laws,”131 and unsurprisingly, the
legality of that single warrant has been challenged in numerous
prosecutions that stemmed from the operation.132 But while exploiting
panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5L7E-28XU]
[hereinafter DON’T PANIC] (detailing how “[t]he audio and video sensors on IoT devices will open up
numerous avenues for government actors to demand access to real-time and recorded
communications”).
128
Pell, supra note 89, at 635. The IoT is a much likelier avenue than side-channel attacks for
authorities to keep gathering information in the face of an increasingly encrypted world. See DON’T
PANIC, supra note 127, at 1315 (describing how IoT devices will provide authorities new
opportunities to gather information). The IoT offers multiple advantages over side-channel attacks in
terms of cost (borne by IoT consumers and vendors, not law enforcement) and simplicity (IoT devices’
audio, video, and metadata records are readily intelligible to police). We can thus expect that law
enforcement will be using IoT devices for surveillance far more often than they will ever use sidechannel attacks, and sooner. See Pell, supra note 89, at 64143 (discussing the advantages IoT devices
provide law enforcement over traditional methods of surveillance, such as wiretapping of phones). In
fact, it’s doing so already. See Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors
in
Murder
Investigation,
NPR
(Dec.
28,
2016,
3:20
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/28/507230487/as-we-leave-more-digital-tracksamazon-echo-factors-in-murder-investigation [https://perma.cc/R3U9-43VT] (describing how Arkansas
police served a search warrant to Amazon for data on its servers that was recorded by the Echo
personal assistant device in the house where they suspected a murder had been committed).
129
See Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking Software Decade Before iPhone Fight, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10years-ago-files-show.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P77U-CR2Z] (describing how the FBI was using
spyware as part of a criminal wiretap as early as 2003); Kevin Poulsen, Documents: FBI Spyware Has
Been Snaring Extortionists, Hackers for Years, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2009, 9:33 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/ [https://perma.cc/GTL2-7U5R] (describing how the
FBI has been using spyware to infiltrate computers for at least seven years as part of its criminal
investigations). Hacking by the government is a complex topic that was well addressed—from
technical and policy standpoints, not a legal one—in Lawful Hacking. See generally Bellovin et al.,
supra note 105 (providing a comprehensive discussion of hacking by the government).
130
See Joseph Cox, The FBI’s ‘Unprecedented’ Hacking Campaign Targeted over a Thousand
Computers, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/thefbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaign-targeted-over-a-thousand-computers
[https://perma.cc/N7Z546SY] (detailing the FBI’s hack over a thousand computers to fight “what it has called one of the
largest child pornography sites on the dark web”).
131
Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 26.
132
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Government ‘Hacking’ and the Playpen Search Warrant, WASH. POST
(Sept.
27,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/27/
government-hacking-and-the-playpen-search-warrant/ [https://perma.cc/84NR-A6LG] (presenting legal
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existing security vulnerabilities in computer systems may be a legally
chancy strategy,133 these flaws will always exist.134 That means
investigators will have plenty of low-hanging fruit to pluck when they seek
to circumvent encryption and gain access to a target’s computer, without
any need to resort to a side-channel attack.135
In the view of “going dark” critics, encryption is far from leaving law
enforcement in the dark. Whether that will continue to be true remains to
be seen, and will depend in part on the success of various “encryption
workarounds,” both legal and technological.136
3. Law Enforcement’s Legal and Technological Responses to “Going
Dark”
Notwithstanding the numerous sources of information available to
them and the unclear extent of the “going dark” problem, law enforcement
officials have nevertheless advocated for both legal and technological
measures to counteract what they call “warrant-proof” encryption’s137
effects on their information-gathering capabilities. As this subsection will
explain, law enforcement has asked legislatures to change the law and
courts to authorize novel strategies for gathering digital evidence.
issues that arise from the FBI’s takeover of a child pornography site in 2014 and subsequent
transmission of malware to the browsers of visitors to the site, such as those involving Fourth
Amendment rights, the limitations of single warrants, and violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
133
Law enforcement has long been aware of the suppression risks associated with its hacking
activities. One early strategy “became so popular with federal law enforcement that Justice Department
lawyers in Washington warned that overuse of the novel technique could result in its electronic
evidence being thrown out of court in some cases.” Poulsen, supra note 129. A March 7, 2002 memo
from the Department of Justice warned that use of the spyware program raised “difficult legal
questions” and suppression risks “without any countervailing benefit.” See id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134
Bellovin et al., supra note 105 at 27–28 (explaining that vulnerabilities will never go away
despite programmers’ best efforts to engineer all the bugs out of their code).
135
KUHN, supra note 32, at 133 (observing in 2003 that EM side-channel attacks were not yet a
“practically relevant information security threat,” and that “[t]he vast majority of practical
vulnerabilities can be exploited using comparatively simple and purely software-based techniques”;
adding caustically, “[t]his is likely to remain the case, as long as information security is only a
secondary consideration in the design and selection of products, equally neglected by both product
designers and end users.”).
136
See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 4, 40. Kerr and Schneier set forth six
categories of encryption workarounds: “find the key,” “guess the key,” “compel the key,” “exploit a
flaw,” “access plaintext when in use,” and “locate a plaintext copy.” Id. at 9–29. Electromagnetic keyrecovery attacks are not discussed in the article, but come closest to a combination of “find the key”
and “exploit a flaw.”
137
E.g., Aarti Shahani, Does Encryption Make Phones 'Warrantproof'? Fact-Checking the FBI,
NPR (Mar. 7, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/07/469545328/does-encryption-makephones-warrant-proof-fact-checking-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/PV5B-NW4Y] (“Apple’s lawyer tells
NPR that Comey’s rhetoric about warrant-proof space is just that – rhetoric – because he’s got a
warrant.”).
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Simultaneously, law enforcement agents rely on digital forensics tools and
“hacks” to circumvent the encryption they encounter during investigations.
The past two years have seen legislative proposals at both the state and
federal level concerning law enforcement’s access to encrypted
information. At state level, bills introduced (unsuccessfully) in three states,
including one based largely on the Manhattan district attorney’s model
bill,138 would have either forced or induced smartphone manufacturers to
ensure that law enforcement could access encrypted smartphones.139
In the Senate, two senators drafted a bill last year to require covered
entities (such as smartphone makers) to comply with court orders for
information by either providing it in “intelligible” form or supplying any
technical assistance “necessary” to render encrypted data intelligible.140
The bill would have effectively closed the “information services”
exemption in CALEA, though it did not acknowledge this impact.141 After
digital security experts roundly condemned the bill, its authors quietly let it
die on the vine.142 Subsequently, despite earlier testimony that he would
not seek “going dark” legislation,143 then-FBI Director Comey vowed to
raise the issue anew this year to the new Congress and administration.144
138

The language of the New York bill and proposed statutory language by the Manhattan district
attorney’s office are almost identical. Compare A.B. A8093, 2016 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), with DA
2015 REPORT app. I.
139
A.B. 1681, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (bill that would have penalized makers of smartphones
and mobile operating systems which they cannot decrypt for law enforcement); H.B. 1040, 2016 Reg.
Sess. (La. 2016) (bill that would have also penalized makers of smartphones and mobile operating
systems which they cannot decrypt for law enforcement); A.B. A8093, 2016 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015)
(bill to require smartphones to be decryptable for law enforcement).
140
Riana Pfefferkorn, Here’s What the Burr-Feinstein Anti-Crypto Bill Gets Wrong, JUST
SECURITY (Apr. 15, 2016, 9:25 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/30606/burr-feinstein-crypto-billterrible/ [https://perma.cc/W7Z6-L5M5].
141
Id.
142
Mark Hosenball, Joseph Menn, & Dustin Volz, Push for Encryption Law Falters Despite
Apple Case Spotlight, REUTERS (May 27, 2016, 1:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaencryption-legislation-idUSKCN0YI0EM [https://perma.cc/DB2M-SSVR]; Leak of Senate Encryption
Bill Prompts Swift Backlash, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-appleencryption-legislation-idUSKCN0X52CG [https://perma.cc/QEC6-NED8].
143
See David Kravets, Obama Administration Won’t Seek Encryption-Backdoor Legislation, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 9, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/obama-administrationwont-seek-encryption-backdoor-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/TA6H-GHEQ] (“Comey said the
administration for now will continue lobbying private industry to create backdoors to allow the
authorities to open up locked devices to investigate criminal cases and terrorism.”).
144
See Associated Press, FBI Director Wants to Resolve Encryption Issue Before ‘Something
Terrible Happens’, NEWS.COM (July 28, 2016, 8:51 PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/
online/security/fbi-director-wants-to-resolve-encryption-issue-before-something-terrible-happens/
news-story/c5dfc8d368719151bfa273147cbca770 [https://perma.cc/5ZMY-2884] (reporting that the
FBI “is collecting encryption-related data from its cases, with the expectation that the debate will
resurface [in 2017],” and that “talks will probably have to wait until after a new president takes
office”); Joe Mullin, FBI Chief Comey: “We Have Never Had Absolute Privacy”, ARS TECHNICA
(Aug. 9, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/fbi-chiefs-complaints-aboutgoing-dark-arent-going-away-will-be-revived-next-year/ [https://perma.cc/C5VL-5YN9] (reporting that
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In the courts, law enforcement has tried several legal strategies for
gaining access to encrypted information. Federal and state law enforcement
agents have sought to compel people to provide passcodes or fingerprints
to unlock their encrypted smartphones, raising Fifth Amendment issues.
The law in this area is still evolving,145 and the analysis is highly factdependent. With regard to passphrases, courts have come out in different
ways depending on the particulars of the case.146 When it comes to
fingerprints, the government has had more uniform success.147 In the few
known instances to date that involve the issue, courts have typically let
compelled fingerprint-unlocking go forward.148
the FBI plans to take its revived encryption push to Congress as well in 2017); Mike Orcutt, The Next
Big
Encryption
Fight,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Feb.
6,
2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603534/the-next-big-encryption-fight/ [https://perma.cc/HL96XBNE] (noting possible congressional or executive-branch avenues for action).
145
See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 19 (“How the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine
applies to compelled decryption is presently uncertain. The open question is what facts must be
established as known by the government to make the testimony implicit in decryption a foregone
conclusion.”); see generally id. at 15–21 (discussing the “practical and legal hurdles rather than
technical ones” that arise in the “compel the key” category of encryption workaround).
146
Compare Florida v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 132, 136–37, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (reviewing
cases “that have addressed the Fifth Amendment implications for providing decryption keys and
passcodes[, which] have largely applied the act-of-production doctrine and the ‘foregone conclusion
exception’” and concluding that the act of providing the phone’s passcode was not testimonial and that
the foregone conclusion exception applied), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d
1335, 1346–49 (11th Cir. 2012) (collecting the cases that had addressed the passcode issue at that time
and concluding that the Fifth Amendment protected the defendant’s refusal to decrypt his encrypted
devices “because the act of decryption and production would be testimonial, and because the
Government cannot show that the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine applies”), and United States v. Apple
Mac Pro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (questioning in dicta whether the correct
focus of the foregone conclusion analysis is on “the Government’s knowledge of the content of the
[encrypted] devices” or instead “on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is
implicit in the act of production”). See generally Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third
Parties: Why the Fourth and Fifth Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals When Third
Parties Are Forced to Hand Over Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 14–27 (2015) [hereinafter
Wilson, Compelling Passwords] (surveying and discussing Fifth Amendment passcode cases).
147
See Cyrus Farivar, To Beat Crypto, Feds Have Tried to Force Fingerprint Unlocking in 2
Cases, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/10/to-beatcrypto-feds-have-tried-to-force-fingerprint-unlocking-in-2-cases/
[https://perma.cc/QV6B-TMSE]
[hereinafter To Beat Crypto] (discussing the government’s Fifth Amendment arguments).
148
E.g., State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 149–51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review granted, No.
A15-2075 (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017) (holding such compulsion not a Fifth Amendment violation); In re
Search Warrant Application for [Redacted], No. 17-M-85, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169384 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 18, 2017) (not a Fifth Amendment violation if police, with a warrant, apply fingers of home’s
four residents onto iPhone’s TouchID sensor); In re Search of iPhone Seized from 3254 Altura Ave. in
Glendale, Cal., No. 2:16-mj-00398, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016),
https://ia601603.us.archive.org/2/items/gov.uscourts.cacd.641321/gov.uscourts.cacd.641321.3.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FHY-S79V] (search warrant authorizing law enforcement agents to depress
individual’s fingerprints onto seized iPhone’s TouchID sensor); To Beat Crypto, supra note 147
(discussing two other fingerprint-unlocking search warrants); see also Wilson, Compelling Passwords,
supra note 146, at 28 n.164 (citing cases that have allowed compelled finger-print unlocking to go
forward).

1418

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1393

The government has argued for aggressive interpretations of federal
law in support of its alleged surveillance and investigative authority.149 The
FBI relied on the Stored Communications Act (SCA) 150 and the Pen
Register Act’s technical-assistance provision151 to obtain court orders and a
seizure warrant compelling encrypted email service provider Lavabit to
hand over its private Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption keys.152 A
federal appeals court declined for procedural reasons to decide whether
those statutes in fact permit the seizure of encryption keys.153
The DOJ has also obtained dozens of orders compelling Apple and
Google to bypass the passcodes of locked, encrypted iPhones and Android
phones for which law enforcement had a warrant, in order to extract data
from the phones.154 It advocates for an expansive interpretation of the
federal All Writs Act (AWA)155 that would allow courts to enlist private
non-parties such as Apple into assisting in investigations.156 While the
149
See generally JENNIFER GRANICK & RIANA PFEFFERKORN, WHEN THE COPS COME AKNOCKING: HANDLING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DEMANDS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Granick-When-The-Cops-Come-A-KnockingHandling-Technical-Assistance-Demands-From-Law-Enforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TGK2LVWF] (slide deck for talk delivered at 2016 Black Hat USA conference, reviewing various kinds of
technical assistance law enforcement has sought or may seek from third-party companies).
150
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
151
Id. § 3124(a) (2012) (“Upon the request of [a government agent], a provider of wire or
electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furnish [the agent]
forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of
the pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference . . . .”).
152
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2014). The target of the investigation was
later revealed to be former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Kim Zetter, A Government Error Just
Revealed Snowden Was the Target in the Lavabit Case, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:30 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/government-error-just-revealed-snowden-target-lavabit-case/
[https://perma.cc/UZT9-VTVQ].
153
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 287–89. The service provider, Lavabit, eventually produced the
keys, then immediately shut down entirely. Kim Zetter, Long Before the Apple-FBI Battle, Lavabit
Sounded a Warning, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/lavabit-applefbi/ [https://perma.cc/6ULL-32DP]. Lavabit relaunched in early 2017. See Kim Zetter, Encrypted Email
Service Once Used by Edward Snowden Relaunches, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 20, 2017, 12:57 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/20/encrypted-email-service-once-used-by-edward-snowden-torelaunch/ [https://perma.cc/2L85-VWZL] (“Rather than undermine the trust and privacy of his users,
Levison ended the company’s email service entirely, preventing the feds from getting access to emails
stored on his servers.”).
154
For a map of all known cases, see All Writs Act Orders for Assistance from Tech Companies,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/all-writs-act-orders-assistance-tech-companies
[https://perma.cc/86WQ-2M7J] (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
155
The AWA permits federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
156
See Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn, The All Writs Act, Software Licenses, and Why
Judges Should Ask More Questions, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 26, 2015, 4:07 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/27109/writs-act-software-licenses-judges-questions/
[https://perma.cc/JUL9-VN5G] (“Under the government’s interpretation of the All Writs Act, anyone
who makes software could be dragooned into assisting the government in investigating users of the
software.”).
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AWA does allow courts to issue orders to non-parties, it is not clear how
far it can be stretched.157 Only two courts have issued public opinions
analyzing these orders’ propriety, and they came out opposite ways.158
Again on the basis of the AWA, the government asked for an unheardof form of novel technical assistance when it wanted access to a passcodelocked iPhone running iOS 9 which had been used by one of the
perpetrators of the December 2015 terror attack in San Bernardino,
California.159 The government sought, and originally received, an AWA
order compelling Apple to write a custom version of iOS for installation on
the phone.160 Rather than targeting the iPhone’s encryption, the custom
software instead would roll back other security features that prevented law
enforcement from running a program to “brute-force” guess the phone’s
passcode.161 After a short but feverish legal battle popularly dubbed “Apple
vs. FBI,” the government dropped the case when it gained access to the
phone by purchasing an exploit from an undisclosed vendor.162 The court
vacated its original order to Apple163 without addressing the merits of the

157
See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–75 (1977) (observing that the AWA
allowed a court to issue an order binding a non-party because there was no other way for the
government to carry out its court-authorized surveillance, the non-party was not too “far removed from
the underlying controversy,” and compliance with the order would not be unduly burdensome).
158
Compare In re Order Requiring XXX, Inc., No. 14 MAG. 2258, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154743, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2014) (concluding that under the AWA, “it is appropriate to order
the manufacturer here to attempt to unlock the cellphone so that the warrant may be executed as
originally contemplated”), with In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
(concluding that the AWA does not permit the relief the government sought, and even if it did, the
government’s application did not satisfy the factors a court may use in deciding whether to issue a
requested writ).
159
Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903eed4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?utm_term=.59773f1934ce [https://perma.cc/L7RJ-EYYR].
Apple can extract data only from iPhones running an older version of iOS. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
160
Nakashima, supra note 159.
161
Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On, WIRED (Feb.
18, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-is-complicated-heres-whatsreally-going-on/ [https://perma.cc/F4C7-FLX6].
162
E.g., Elias Groll, FBI Confirms It Won’t Reveal iPhone Exploit to Apple, FOREIGN POLICY
(Apr. 27, 2016, 2:14 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/27/fbi-confirms-it-wont-reveal-iphoneexploit-to-apple/ [https://perma.cc/F8KT-NNY7]; Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers
One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-feeto-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d3633d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.81fcea955737
[https://perma.cc/7RPD-YVUW];
Elizabeth
Weise, Apple v FBI Timeline: 43 Days That Rocked Tech, USA TODAY (Mar. 15, 2016, 6:26 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/15/apple-v-fbi-timeline/81827400/
[https://perma.cc/3GJR-NH3G] [hereinafter Apple v FBI Timeline].
163
Apple v FBI Timeline, supra note 162.
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FBI’s broad legal arguments, leaving the AWA’s scope still undefined.164
“Apple vs. FBI” shows that law enforcement need not rely on pushing
aggressive legal theories in order to get help in circumventing encryption.
Law enforcement has a long history of exploiting hardware and software
vulnerabilities to “hack” into suspects’ electronic devices.165 Federal, state,
and local police also use digital forensics tools to crack passcodes and
extract data from devices.166 Such tools are now commonplace in city
police departments nationwide.167 Police can get data off locked devices,
recover deleted text messages and photos, and access data in the cloud, all
without assistance from service providers or smartphone makers.168
Between government hacking and third-party digital forensics devices,
police have a number of technological tools available to get access to
electronic evidence. These technological means further call into question
law enforcement’s claim that encryption’s rise is causing it to “go dark.”
C. Side-Channel Attacks Aren’t a Feasible Law Enforcement
Technique—Yet
The availability of so many options for information-gathering makes it
seem somewhat premature to discuss the constitutionality of warrantless
side-channel attacks. The police probably are not using side-channel
attacks at present and probably won’t for a while yet. Investigators won’t
resort to difficult, high-tech surveillance strategies unless the amount of
plaintext and metadata available through established surveillance
164
Alina Selyukh, Apple vs. the FBI: The Unanswered Questions and Unsettled Issues, NAT’L
PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 29, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2016/03/29/472141323/apple-vs-the-fbi-the-unanswered-questions-and-unsettled-issues
[https://perma.cc/Q3E8-6XY3]; see also Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 30 (predicting that
“the degree of third-party assistance that can be legally compelled is likely to be a continuing theme of
the law of encryption workarounds”).
165
See Bellovin, supra note 105, at 31–32, 43 (addressing the government’s exploitation of
vulnerabilities, the warrant issues that arise in this context, and the vulnerability and exploit markets);
see supra Section II.B.2 and notes 137–38.
166
Joseph B. Evans, Cell Phone Forensics: Powerful Tools Wielded by Federal Investigators,
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (June 2, 2016), http://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2016/06/02/cell-phoneforensics-powerful-tools-wielded-by-federal-investigators/ [https://perma.cc/XBB4-2D8Y]. Indeed, the
government had considered, but ultimately rejected, the use of such tools in the “Apple vs. FBI” case.
See Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn, A Quick Update: Apple, Privacy, and the All Writs Act of
1789, JUST SEC. (Oct. 30, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27214/quick-update-appleprivacy-writs-act-1789/ [https://perma.cc/A8DX-CNFP] (discussing the use of forensics tools in the
“Apple vs. FBI” case).
167
George Joseph, Cellphone Spy Tools Have Flooded Local Police Departments, CITYLAB (Feb.
8,
2017),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2017/02/cellphone-spy-tools-have-flooded-local-policedepartments/512543/ [https://perma.cc/VH2E-8FAM] [hereinafter Joseph]; Curtis Waltman, How the
Denver Police Crack and Search Cell Phones, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 11, 2017 9:00 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-the-denver-police-crack-and-search-cell-phones
[https://perma.cc/59PG-AZ4Q] [hereinafter Waltman].
168
Joseph, supra note 167.
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mechanisms, government hacking, and forensics tools really does
plummet.
Side-channel attacks are not only unnecessary at present, they are
impractical. Agents need to buy the requisite equipment, learn to use it
correctly, and position it (and usually themselves) close to the target’s
device(s) for as long as needed to accomplish the attack. The equipment
needed is usually conspicuous and/or very limited in range. What is more,
even after collecting the side-channel information, agents have to take
additional steps to convert the raw data they collected into information
they can actually use: the target’s secret encryption key. This means having
specialist personnel on hand (i.e., a trained computer scientist), and the
process may fail multiple times before a key is extracted successfully.169
These considerations make side-channel attacks much less attractive
than traditional police methods, established electronic-surveillance
methods, and digital forensics. Tailing a target in person takes up agents’
time, but it does not take a Ph.D. in computer science to learn how to do it.
Fully-remote surveillance (such as carrying out a Title III wiretap) is more
convenient than having to monitor a target from nearby. Getting the
target’s emails from his service provider may cost money, but paying out a
reimbursement to the carrier170 (which maintains all the servers, stores all
the data, and does all the work) is more straightforward than equipment
procurement, assembly, testing, and training. Digital forensics devices cost
money, too, but the costs are relatively modest171—and, notably, many

169

For example, in one recently-demonstrated electromagnetic key-extraction attack on mobile
devices, after measuring an iPhone’s electromagnetic emanations, actually extracting the secret
encryption key required multiple steps of signal processing and cryptanalysis; the final step alone took
two hours, and the researchers successfully recovered the secret key only twice out of thirty tries. See
ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 13–14.
170
See 18 U.S.C. § 2706 (2012) (requiring the government to pay a fee to service providers when
it “obtain[s] the contents of communications, records, or other information” from them under certain
sections of the Stored Communications Act, as “reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably
necessary and which have been directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or
otherwise providing such information”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (requiring compensation for
wiretap assistance); 18 U.S.C. § 3124(c) (2012) (requiring compensation for assistance with pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices).
171
The exploit used to access the iPhone at issue in the “Apple vs. FBI” matter allegedly cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars, but that is atypical. Mark Hosenball, FBI Paid Under $1 Million to
Unlock San Bernardino iPhone: Sources, REUTERS (May 4, 2016, 4:03 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-idUSKCN0XQ032
[https://perma.cc/JAV7B5XY]. Digital forensics company Cellebrite’s services cost as little as $1,500. Thomas Fox-Brewster,
It Might Cost the FBI Just $1,500 to Get into Terrorist’s iPhone, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 2:20 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/03/23/cellebrite-apple-iphone-fbi-syed-farookalexander-boettcher/#7b7569f02c74 [https://perma.cc/D9DG-FMNF]. Cellebrite’s mobile device
forensics machines cost around $2,500 to $16,000 as of 2015. Peter Stephenson, Cellebrite UFED
Series Product Review, SC MEDIA (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.scmagazine.com/cellebrite-ufedseries/review/7046/ [https://perma.cc/TZ9W-77CT].

1422

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1393

172

cities’ police departments already have them.
In short: side-channel attacks cost money, time, personnel, expertise,
and convenience. Law enforcement has yet to “go dark” enough for such
burdensome undertakings to start looking like a viable option.173 But that
day is coming. The FBI predicted in 2011 that as encryption becomes
ubiquitous, most criminals will stay unsophisticated enough to keep getting
caught, but the agency will occasionally need to craft burdensome
“individualized solutions” for “very sophisticated target[s]” who encrypt
their communications (such that not even the third-party carriers can
decrypt them for law enforcement).174
At the same time, the development of side-channel attacks keeps pace
with the current generation of consumer electronics in popular use: from
CRT monitors175 to flat-screen displays,176 from typewriters177 to iPhones
and iPads.178 And the attacks keep coming down in price and complexity of
the equipment involved.179 If law enforcement believes its need to resort to
“individualized solutions” will increase over time, while the cost and
complexity of side-channel attacks will continue to decrease, then
eventually, those two trend lines will intersect. That is the point where
172

Joseph, supra note 167; Waltman, id.
See Swire, supra note 102.
174
Pell, supra note 89, at 622 (quoting 2011 congressional testimony of then-FBI general counsel
Valerie Caproni on the “going dark” issue). “In other words, time, energy, and resources must be
expended to determine how to acquire data about a specific target that would otherwise readily be
available from third parties with an appropriate court order without all these additional transaction
costs.” Id. at 625.
175
See van Eck, supra note 17.
176
Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks, supra note 30, at 1, 2 (discussing the popular use of
flat-screen display devices by consumers).
177
In the early 1980s, Soviet spies conducted acoustic side-channel attacks against IBM Selectric
typewriters in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: they bugged the typewriters with tiny microphones that
allowed them to hear each key struck and thereby determine each individual letter being typed.
SHARON A. MANEKI, CTR. FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HIST., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, LEARNING FROM THE
ENEMY: THE GUNMAN PROJECT 1, 14–21 (2012), https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologicheritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/assets/files/gunmanproject/Learning_From_the_Enemy_The_GUNMAN_Project.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7BB-ACJF].
178
See ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 2.
179
In 2012, a key-extraction attack conducted by analyzing mobile devices’ radio-frequency (RF)
emissions cost $1,000 in equipment. GARY KENWORTHY & PANKAJ ROHATGI, MOBILE DEVICE
SECURITY:
THE
CASE
FOR
SIDE
CHANNEL
RESISTANCE
1
(2012),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4d1c/e909dfed6d9476cda5a1f546a98388466a4d.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7LPQ-DL76]. In 2016, Genkin et al. demonstrated a “cheap low-bandwidth key
extraction attack[]” against mobile devices that cost a little over $50 in scavenged or eBay-bought
equipment, distinguishing it from previous attacks that had “used expensive lab-grade equipment, such
as oscilloscopes, for their measurements.” ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 1, 16, 18.
Similarly, the same Genkin team had demonstrated a key-extraction attack against various laptop
computers in 2015 that “us[ed] simple and readily available equipment, . . . [or,] [a]lternatively, . . . a
common, consumer-grade radio,” both of which “avoid the expensive equipment used in prior attacks,
such as low-noise amplifiers, high-speed digitizers, sensitive ultrasound microphones, and professional
electromagnetic probes.” STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, at 4, 5.
173
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side-channel attacks will make the jump from military and intelligence use
to law enforcement use.
When side-channel attacks eventually do become a law enforcement
technique, the first to use them will be federal law enforcement, which, as
noted, already anticipates the need for tailored solutions for individual
targets.180 Last year, the FBI asked Congress for over $38 million just to
develop and acquire tools to counter encryption’s impact on the FBI’s
information-gathering abilities.181 It is not clear from the request just what
tools the FBI contemplates, but equipment for side-channel cryptanalysis
can be interpreted to fall within the category of “cryptanalytic capability”
tools listed in the request.182
At the state and local level, where budgets are more constrained, police
probably won’t deploy side-channel attacks against suspects unless and
until they become less labor- and resource-intensive. That said, the FBI
partners with state and local law enforcement agencies around the country
to conduct digital evidence examinations and give digital forensics
trainings.183 Those partnerships could extend in future to the FBI’s loaning
its side-channel attack expertise to state and local police.184
What is more, state and local law enforcement agencies have a wellestablished track record of eventually obtaining technologies that
originated for military or intelligence use. Defense contractor Harris
Corporation’s “Stingray” surveillance device, a “cell-site simulator” that
allows police to extract data from cell phones by mimicking a wireless
carrier’s cell tower and forcing the phone to connect to it, was originally
180

See Pell, supra note 89, at 622 (quoting Caproni testimony discussing law enforcement’s
development of methods to overcome encryption used by criminal targets).
181
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2017 AUTHORIZATION AND
BUDGET REQUEST TO CONGRESS 1-1, 2-1, 5-6 (2016) [hereinafter FBI 2017 BUDGET REQUEST],
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/821341/download [https://perma.cc/5JEV-3J9Y] (requesting $38.3
million “[t]o counter the threat of Going Dark, which includes the inability to access data because of
challenges related to encryption, mobility, and anonymization. The FBI will develop and acquire tools
for electronic device analysis, cryptanalytic capability, and forensic tools.”); Lorenzo FranceschiBicchierai, The FBI Wants $38 More Million to Buy Encryption-Breaking Technology, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 10, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-fbi-wants38-million-to-buy-encryption-breaking-technology [https://perma.cc/2RSQ-4RN2].
182
See FBI 2017 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 181, at 2-1.
183
See
REGIONAL
COMPUTER
FORENSICS
LABORATORY,
https://www.rcfl.gov
[https://perma.cc/U7BF-ERJG] (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); Aliya Sternstein, Hunting for Evidence,
Secret Service Unlocks Phone Data with Force or Finesse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2017/0202/Hunting-for-evidence-Secret-Service-unlocksphone-data-with-force-or-finesse
[https://perma.cc/7AVV-TWVX]
(describing
local
police
departments’ partnership with the Secret Service, which “has become a valuable resource for law
enforcement units that may not have strong enough decryption tools” to get into smartphones).
184
See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 30, 33–35 (differing resource levels could
“lead to the federal government taking over certain kinds of state and local investigations,” depending
on the workaround needed; not every workaround “require[s] technical expertise and deep pockets”
like federal law enforcement authorities have).
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developed for the military and intelligence community. Thanks in part to
grants by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),186 Stingrays and
other cell-site simulators are now in widespread use by police departments
around the country187—which have gone to great lengths to keep the details
secret from the courts, local governments, and the public.188 So, too,
“mobile X-ray vans” first used in Afghanistan are now in (highly secretive,
inadequately overseen) use by New York City police “to look through the
walls of buildings or the sides of trucks.”189
It thus takes no great stretch of the imagination to envision a near
future where first the FBI and then garden-variety police departments
begin adopting the intelligence community’s side-channel techniques for
circumventing encryption, if the price is right. The equipment for
conducting side-channel attacks could become the latest device handed
down to local law enforcement authorities, with the FBI supplying the
expertise to carry off the attack and DHS (read: taxpayers) footing the bill.
D. Hypothetical:
Criminal

Investigating

a

Sophisticated

Crypto-Using

What would a near-future side-channel cryptanalysis operation look
like? Side-channel attacks are likely to be deployed by law enforcement—
if at all—only in very particular circumstances. Picture a high-value
criminal target who uses encryption to shield his communications and
stored data from prying eyes. He also uses a password manager to log into
his accounts.190 The police have obtained wiretap orders to intercept the
185

Jeremy Scahill & Margot Williams, Stingrays: A Secret Catalogue of Government Gear for
Spying on Your Cellphone, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:23 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2015/12/17/a-secret-catalogue-of-government-gear-for-spying-on-your-cellphone/
[https://perma.cc/S3A5-K876] (describing how Stingrays work and their military/intelligence origins).
186
Id.
187
Joseph, supra note 167 (enumerating city police departments nationwide that have purchased
cell phone surveillance tools). Joseph’s article describes the unusually powerful “Dirtbox” cell-site
simulator, which was used by the NSA for mass surveillance in France and which Baltimore police
have owned since 2012. Id.
188
Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-phones-shhh-itssecret.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/73ZK-VWC8]; Daniel Rivero, It’s Now a Trend: Third Court
Orders the Release of Phone-Tracking Stingray Documents, FUSION (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:46 PM),
http://fusion.net/story/105521/courts-ordering-the-release-of-stingray-documents-is-now-a-trend/
[https://perma.cc/F5AX-UL9L].
189
Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Is Using Mobile X-Ray Vans to Spy on Unknown Targets,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/411181/ [https://perma.cc/W56N2YSD].
190
A password manager obviates the need to manually enter one’s password when logging into
one’s accounts. Lucian Constantin, 5 Things You Need to Know about Password Managers, PCWORLD
(June 18, 2016, 6:34 AM) [hereinafter 5 Things], http://www.pcworld.com/article/3085395/security/5things-you-should-know-about-password-managers.html [https://perma.cc/5374-3A55]. A password
manager can frustrate an attacker’s attempt to learn a target’s account passwords via side-channel
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target’s communications (such as phone calls, email, and text messages)
and warrants to search and seize his stored data (such as documents in
cloud-storage accounts, or emails stored on his email provider’s servers).
However, they have been able to obtain only minimal, incomplete, or
irrelevant information from the service providers the suspect uses.
Intercepting his phone calls, email, and text messages in transit proves
fruitless, as they are encrypted end-to-end and the police are unsuccessful
in obtaining plaintext.191 He has turned off backups wherever possible, uses
a messaging app that does not store copies of messages on its servers,192
and has encrypted the documents and email he stores on his service
providers’ servers using a separate, extra layer of encryption beyond that
built into the service.193 This renders the service providers unable to
decrypt the stored files for law enforcement.194
information from his computer display (since the letters are not showing up in cleartext on the screen as
he types them in), keyboard, or smartphone touchscreen (since he is not tapping in his account
passwords). See TouchLogger, supra note 15 (discussing smartphone touchscreen side-channel
attacks); TapLogger, supra note 15 (same); Stealing Pins, supra note 15 (discussing revealing PINs
using data from smartphone’s motion and orientation sensors); Vuagnoux & Pasini, supra note 35
(discussing side-channel attacks on keyboards). True, the attacker could learn the master password the
target uses to log into his password manager. That would be a serious security breach, as the master
password is a “single point of failure” that would compromise all of the accounts managed by the
password manager. See 5 Things, supra. But learning the master password is less valuable to a sidechannel attacker if the password manager is the “offline” kind, i.e., it does not sync across devices and
the master password is never sent to the password management service provider. Id. Even if the
attacker gleans the master password through a side-channel attack, he won’t be able to log into the
target’s password manager (and from thence into all the target’s accounts) unless he gains direct
physical access to the device—in which case the game is already over.
191
They do succeed sometimes in real investigations, according to the Wiretap Reports
transmitted annually to Congress by the United States Courts. The reports include information on the
number of wiretaps where investigators “encountered” encryption (to wit: very, very few) and whether
they were nevertheless able to obtain plaintext (to wit: sometimes). The reports do not reveal how
investigators were able to get plaintext in the instances where they succeeded, or what (if any) methods
they tried that failed. See Wiretap Reports, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/analysis-reports/wiretap-reports [https://perma.cc/83CE-TANS] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017)
(repository of annual reports going back to 1997).
192
Signal works this way. See Micah Lee, Security Tips Every Signal User Should Know, THE
INTERCEPT (July 2, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/07/02/security-tips-every-signaluser-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/W33L-DYYQ] (“Unlike other messaging apps, Signal doesn’t
store a copy of your messages on internet servers (‘in the cloud’).”).
193
This “belt and suspenders” option adds an extra layer of protection to data in the cloud. As
discussed, cloud service providers typically can provide user data to law enforcement in plaintext form
pursuant to a warrant, even if the provider encrypts the stored information. See supra Section I.B.3 &
note 142. Several programs allow users to encrypt their files before uploading them to cloud storage.
E.g., Cale Hunt, How to Encrypt Data Before Storing It in the Cloud (and Why You Should), WINDOWS
CENT. (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.windowscentral.com/how-encrypt-data-storing-it-cloudand-why-you-should [https://perma.cc/4EE8-EGXB].
194
As noted supra in Section II.B.1, “information services” such as cloud storage providers are
not required by federal law to build law enforcement surveillance capabilities into their systems. 47
U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2) (2012). And even entities that are so mandated are not responsible for decrypting
data unless they provided the encryption and have the ability to decrypt the data. Id. § 1002(b)(3).
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In short, the usual avenues of gathering electronic evidence are closed
off. But without the target’s unencrypted data and communications, law
enforcement does not have enough information for a conviction, maybe not
even enough to show probable cause for an arrest. To keep pursuing this
investigation, they will need to craft a more individualized approach.
One rather blunt option with encryption-savvy suspects is to get the
necessary warrants, then grab the target’s laptop or phone off him in public
while he is using it.195 If he has his device and accounts open, then he
already entered his passphrases to unlock them, and the police can access
his unencrypted data.196 But that may not be feasible: perhaps the target
rarely appears out in the open using his devices, or he is always covered by
a bodyguard; perhaps physical interception poses too great a risk to officer
safety; maybe the police are not willing to give away the existence of the
investigation yet.
To get the plaintext, one option is for police to obtain the target’s
passphrases, or the private encryption keys themselves. Law enforcement
wants a way to get that information, without touching the target or his
devices, from enough of a remove that they can operate safely and without
giving their presence away. Their solution: conduct a side-channel attack
to obtain the target’s private encryption key. Now the question arises: do
they need a warrant? If so, and they do not get one, they risk exclusion of
crucial evidence they see no other way to obtain.197 The next Section
195

This has happened at least twice. The operator of online black market the Silk Road, Ross
Ulbricht, shielded his activities by using an encrypted instant messaging program and a full-disk
encryption program for his laptop. FBI agents worked around those measures by apprehending him in
October 2013 while he was sitting in a library with his laptop open. The agents created a distraction,
then grabbed the laptop Ulbricht had been using moments before, pursuant to “orders . . . to seize the
laptop in an open and unencrypted state.” Sarah Jeong, The Dread Pirate’s Diary, FORBES (Jan. 22,
2015,
12:14
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahjeong/2015/01/22/the-dread-piratesdiary/#1f634c8b37d3 [https://perma.cc/25FA-ULL7]. More recently, Scotland Yard took a page from
the FBI’s playbook when, late last year, undercover officers from the Metropolitan Police “mugged” a
suspected credit-card fraudster on the street while he had his iPhone unlocked. Dominic Casciani &
Gaetan Portal, Phone Encryption: Police “Mug” Suspect to Get Data, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38183819 [https://perma.cc/ZW4P-6ZRR]; see also Encryption
Workarounds, supra note 60, at 24–26 (discussing these cases as examples of the “access plaintext
when the device is in use” category of encryption workaround).
196
The option to compel the target to hand over his encryption keys or passphrases is an unsettled
legal question, see supra Section II.B.3, and requires the investigation to have progressed far enough
that police already have the suspect and his devices in custody, which has not yet happened in our
hypothetical.
197
The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is intended “to deter
future Fourth Amendment violations.” United States v. Davis, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011) (citation
omitted). Notably, there are significant limitations on the suppression remedy in the electronicevidence context. Suppression is not an available remedy under the Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2708, 2712 (2012) or the Pen Register Act. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358
(5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 1991). For Wiretap Act
violations, suppression is available only as to wire and oral communications, not electronic
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198

addresses this question.

III. APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINES TO SIDE-CHANNEL
CRYPTANALYSIS
The courts have yet to define the Fourth Amendment’s scope when it
comes to the sorts of intrusions implicated in side-channel attacks. These
intrusions can occur without any physical interference, against computing
devices not necessarily located within a home or office, to glean
information that may or may not count as “content” information. Thus, the
answer to the question of whether side-channel attacks require a warrant is
every lawyer’s favorite phrase: it depends. This Section quickly reviews
the Supreme Court’s two rubrics for Fourth Amendment analyses, then
proceeds to analyze what legal process is required for a particular kind of
side-channel attack—an electromagnetic key-recovery attack—by asking
“what,” “where,” and “how.”199
First, what side-channel information is law enforcement acquiring?
What legal mechanism (if any) authorizes the seizure of encryption keys
depends on whether the information counts as “content” information or
“non-content” information.
Second, where is the side-channel information being acquired from?
This Article assumes the information is being obtained from an “end
point”: the targeted individual’s electronic device, i.e., a cell phone, tablet,
laptop, or desktop computer. A device has the strongest privacy protection
when it is inside the home, but a warrant may still be required for sidechannel attacks against devices located outside the home.
Third, how is law enforcement acquiring the side-channel information?
Side-channel attacks do not involve any physical trespass, but they
measure emanations that are typically not detectable by human senses
unaided. Kyllo v. United States200 supplies the rule for determining whether
a warrant is needed: Did police use “sense-enhancing technology” “that is
communications. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2515).
198
This hypothetical fact pattern is admittedly abstruse. In the author’s defense, this is a law
review piece—one that discusses computer security research, which rivals legal academia in its
propensity for coming up with possible, but unlikely scenarios that have no bearing on the vast
majority of situations that arise in the real world. See James Mickens, This World of Ours, USENIX
(Jan. 2014), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7GEFMTW] (“Unfortunately, large swaths of the security community are fixated on avant garde horrors . . .
. [S]ecurity people need to get their priorities straight . . . . In the real world, threat models are much
simpler.”). And after all, truth has a way of turning out to be stranger than fiction. See Jeong, supra
note 195 (discussing the saga of the Dread Pirate Roberts).
199
The Article assumes that the “who” is U.S. law enforcement agents (federal, state, or local)
investigating a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil for crimes unrelated to terrorism or national security, which are
extremely complex areas of law out of scope of the Article.
200
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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not in general public use” to obtain information from a constitutionallyprotected area?201 The Article proposes a set of factors for determining
whether a technology is “in general public use,” then uses them to analyze
various side-channel attacks.
The Section concludes by criticizing current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, particularly the Kyllo “general public use” rule, as
inadequate to protect Americans’ privacy rights from erosion by
technological advances.
A. The Property-Based and Katz v. United States Approaches to the
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”202 For a search or seizure to be reasonable, law enforcement
generally (with certain exceptions) must first get a judicial warrant
supported by probable cause.203
For half a century, in determining what counts as a “search” or
“seizure” necessitating a warrant, courts have relied upon the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test first formulated in Justice Harlan’s famous
concurrence in Katz v. United States.204 Under Katz, the Fourth
Amendment is applicable only if the individual seeking its protection had a
subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that was
invaded by the state’s action.205
The Katz test remains the courts’ “lodestar” when evaluating the
constitutionality of “a particular form of government-initiated electronic
surveillance.”206 But it is not the only test. Prior to Katz, the Court took an
“exclusively property-based approach” to the Fourth Amendment,
informed by the common law of trespass.207 Gradually, the Court came to
understand that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations,”208 eventually proclaiming in Katz that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”209 That is, “a forbidden search
can occur even when no trespass is involved.”210 The one rubric did not
201

Id. at 34–35, 40.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
203
Id.; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
204
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
205
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–41 (1979) (citations omitted).
206
Id. at 739 (footnote omitted).
207
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (citations omitted).
208
Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992).
209
389 U.S. at 351.
210
United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (Noonan, J., dissenting), rev’d,
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
202
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replace the other: “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substituted for,” the property-centric test.211
In this century, the Supreme Court has called upon both tests when
considering the constitutionality of particular forms of informationgathering by police. Yet the Court’s decisions have somewhat muddied the
waters by focusing on the intrusions’ location in the sacrosanct space of the
home in two of three major cases (Kyllo and Jardines), and, in the third
(Jones), on another physical trespass on property. This complicates the task
of predicting how courts will rule on future Fourth Amendment challenges
to warrantless use of non-trespassory side-channel attacks.
B. What: Content versus Non-Content Information
What kind of information are police obtaining when they measure EM
emissions in a side-channel key-recovery attack? The legal process
required for an electromagnetic key-recovery attack depends on the
characterization of an encryption key: does it qualify as content or noncontent information? This is an open question as yet unaddressed by the
courts, but it will be crucial when a court analyzes a key-recovery attack.
1. Are Encryption Keys “Content” or Not?
The courts212 and federal law213 both draw a distinction between
“content” and “non-content” information. “Content” information means,
basically, “a message that a person wants to communicate,” whereas “noncontent” information can be characterized as “information about the
communication that the [communications] network uses to deliver and
process” the contents of the communication.214 If an encryption key
211

Jones, 565 U.S. at 409.
“The Supreme Court has . . . forged a clear distinction between” content information, which
generally is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection (unless some exception applies), and non-content
information, from which the Court has repeatedly chosen to “expressly withhold[] Fourth Amendment
protection.” United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “Content”
is not limited to communications; documents, i.e., personal papers that are not communicated to
someone else, are also “content.” Id. at 434 n.13 (“[D]ocuments stored on phones and remote servers
are protected, as ‘content,’ in the same way that the contents of text messages or documents and effects
stored in a rented storage unit or office are protected.”) (citations omitted).
213
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
214
Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 (2004) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide]. ECPA affords greater privacy protections to content information than
to non-content information “for reasons that most people find intuitive.” See id. (“Actual contents of
messages naturally implicate greater privacy concerns than information (much of it network-generated)
about those communications.”). However, the distinction between content and non-content information
has become extremely blurry, as described in a recent article by several computer security experts.
Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic
212
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qualifies as content information, then its seizure will typically require a
warrant; not so if it is non-content information,215 though it may still be
protected under some provision of ECPA.216
Commentators disagree as to which definition best characterizes
encryption keys. Some have argued that “[t]he encryption key has no
communicative . . . content of its own but is merely a tool for deciphering
the intercepted communication.”217 Lavabit took this stance in the Fourth
Circuit, maintaining that its SSL keys were not “contents,” but “simply
cryptographic tools . . . that convey neither meaning nor message.”218 A
competing perspective counters that “when viewed in totality,” encryption
keys should be treated like content information because they “change
content from unreadable to readable text, thereby communicating
information.”219 That is, the key’s functional aspect (scrambling or
unscrambling text) does not extinguish its communicative properties.220
And a third view is that the answer depends on what kind of key is at issue.
For example, a court could distinguish between an email system’s SSL
keys and a particular user’s long-term identity key by finding that the latter
Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 73–79 (2016); see also Mayer, supra note 116 (discussing
how non-content metadata reveals a pattern of all our activities even without content information).
215
See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433; In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724
F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[c]ommunications content” requires a warrant, but addressing and
routing information do not) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008)).
216
See United States v. Walker, No. 16-cr-567 (JSR), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38102, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2017) (Title II of ECPA, the Stored Communications Act, largely draws distinctions
that “track the rule that the contents of communications are generally protected by the Fourth
Amendment, whereas information principally used in transmitting the information is generally not,”
with some exceptions) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–87 (6th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3569 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402)). Of course, state laws and constitutions
also protect the privacy of content and non-content information, sometimes more so than their federal
counterparts; however, they are out of scope of this Article. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, At the Privacy
Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939412
[http://perma.cc/KE75-VPQC] (describing how a new California statute “improves upon” ECPA in its
“expansiveness and its additional protections”).
217
Scott Brady, Note, Keeping Secrets: A Constitutional Examination of Encryption Regulation in
the United States and India, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 325 (2012) (citing Joel C.
Mandelman, Lest We Walk into the Well: Guarding the Keys - Encrypting the Constitution: To Speak,
Search & Seize in Cyberspace, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 227, 272–73 (1998)) (discussing encryption
keys in Fifth Amendment context).
218
Br. of Appellant at 18, In re Under Seal, Nos. 13-4625(L), 13-4626 (4th Cir. Oct. 10, 2013),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/804263/lavabit-opening-brief-filedversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y4Q-2FVS] [hereinafter Lavabit Brief] (citing ECPA’s definition of
“contents,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012)).
219
Wilson, Compelling Passwords, supra note 146, at 21 & n.112 (acknowledging “the
uncertainty of whether passwords [and keys] are content or non-content data”). The article uses the
term “password” to include “encryption keys.” Id. at 3 n.1.
220
See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141–42 (holding that encryption software source code’s functional
aspects could not “overwhelm[] any constitutional protections that expression might otherwise enjoy”).
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communicates that the user is who she claims to be and the message she is
sending is authentic,221 while the former communicate nothing.
Given these conflicting arguments, it is not clear how a court would
rule in a case involving the seizure of private encryption keys. If the court
deems them to be non-content information, then as said, the Fourth
Amendment does not require police to get a warrant, although some form
of process may be required by statute.222 If the court holds that the keys are
content information, that does not end the analysis: the court still must ask
where and how police conducted the key-extraction attack.
2. What Legal Process Authorizes the Seizure of Encryption Keys?
Whether encryption keys are content or non-content guides what legal
process (if any) is required to seize them. When investigators seek a
target’s encryption keys in order to access evidence in plaintext, “finding
the key often requires the legal authority to search for and seize it.”223 For
the seizure of encryption keys, that legal authority is not clear-cut, and
which authority applies requires careful examination of exactly what it is
that law enforcement wishes to seize.
a. Search Warrants

221

See Felten, supra note 21, at 3, 4 (“A party can use its long-term identity key to prove its
identity to other parties,” and a malicious actor who learns that key could impersonate the user).
222
See supra notes 205–12 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment also affords no protection to “information [someone] voluntarily turns over to third
parties.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976). The third-party doctrine should not apply to private encryption keys. A user’s private device
and long-term identity keys are not transmitted to third parties. See supra notes 21, 22 and
accompanying text. Session keys for encrypting messages are exchanged only between the two parties
to the communication. See Felten, supra note 21, at 3 (session keys are “known only to the two of
them”). That is, they are not disclosed to the encrypted communications service provider. “Without a
third party, the third party doctrine is inapplicable.” United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606,
614–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (unlike cell-site location information “pings” voluntarily transmitted by
phones to cell network, location information involuntarily transmitted by phone directly to
government’s cell-site simulator was not subject to third-party doctrine).
The Lavabit case is not to the contrary. Lavabit architected its service so that it held the “single
set of [private and public] SSL keys for all its various subscribers.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276,
280 (4th Cir. 2014). Lavabit’s users “never had access to those private keys.” Lavabit Brief, supra note
218, at 22. That is, Lavabit was not a “third party” to whom its users turned over their private keys.
And anyway, there is no need to resort to a side-channel attack if a provider holds the encryption keys
police seek. As they did with Lavabit, police can try to demand the keys directly from the service
provider. That implicates different legal issues than does seizure from the user. See Encryption
Workarounds, supra note 60, at 15–16; see generally When the Cops Come A-Knocking, supra note
149 (reviewing law enforcement’s authority to demand various kinds of information or assistance from
third-party service providers).
223
Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 11.
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The Fourth Amendment permits warrants to issue only upon probable
cause224 to believe that the search will turn up “fruits, instrumentalities, or
evidence of a crime.”225 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which
governs the issuance of warrants, enumerates similar categories of property
subject to search and seizure.226
Encryption keys do not fit comfortably within these categories. In
appealing a seizure warrant, encrypted email service provider Lavabit227
argued that there was no probable cause to seize its private SSL encryption
keys.228 Its keys were not fruits, instrumentalities, evidence (either of a
crime or for impeachment), or contraband.229 Nor are encryption keys
designed or intended for criminal use: encryption programs are legal and
general-purpose.230 There is thus an argument that the Fourth Amendment
and Rule 41 do not authorize the seizure of encryption keys.231
All the same, Lavabit’s facts will not apply in every case. Depending
on the specific facts presented in a warrant application, a court might
decide that even if an encryption key is not evidence, fruit, or contraband,
it is an instrumentality of a crime (e.g., possession of child pornography),
and conclude that seizure with a warrant is proper.232 The government, for
its part, appears to find the propriety of a warrant to be uncontroversial: the
DOJ’s model electronic-evidence warrant includes encryption keys in the

224

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 549–50 (1978).
226
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (authorizing the search or seizure only of property that is “evidence of a
crime,” “contraband, fruits of a crime, or other items illegally possessed,” or “designed for use,
intended for use, or used in committing a crime”). We assume a federal investigation governed by
federal procedural rules because side-channel attacks are more likely to be the province of federal
investigators than of state or local authorities. See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 30, 33–
35.
227
See supra Section II.B.3.
228
Lavabit Brief, supra note 218, at 20–24; see also When the Cops Come A-Knocking, supra
note 149 (noting, in slides 23 through 25, that encryption keys are not evidence of a crime or
contraband, discussing the Lavabit seizure warrant, and concluding that it is unknown whether a
warrant can be used to compel keys’ disclosure to police).
229
Id. at 20, 22–23 (citing Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 549–50). The Fourth Circuit declined on
procedural grounds to rule on the merits of this argument. In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 285–86.
230
See supra Section II.A.
231
Cf. In re Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134,
135 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 require “probable cause to believe
that the information sought is itself evidence of a crime,” not that it is merely “relevant to an
investigation” or “can be expected to produce admissible evidence”). This opinion has been critiqued
for “read[ing] more into Rule 41 than was intended.” In re Application of the U.S. of Am., 727 F.
Supp. 2d 571, 581 (W.D. Tex. 2010).
232
Cf. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577–78, 581 (D.N.J. 2001) (upholding
investigators’ use of keystroke logger, which “was devised by F.B.I. engineers using previously
developed techniques in order to obtain a target’s key and key-related information,” to get passphrase
to encrypted computer file) (discussed in Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 10–11).
225
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233

b. ECPA
ECPA is the federal statutory framework that primarily governs
electronic surveillance.234 It provides several means for law enforcement to
obtain “content” information about communications. The Wiretap Act
(Title I of ECPA) governs seizures of the contents of “electronic
communications” in transit;235 the Stored Communications Act (SCA)
(Title II of ECPA) governs seizures of contents in electronic storage.236
It is questionable whether these provisions should apply to seizure of
encryption keys. Private keys arguably do not count as “electronic
communications” or “contents” thereof. An “electronic communication”
entails a “transfer” of information over a “system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce” (such as the internet).237 But private encryption keys
should never be transmitted over such a system.238 And an individual’s
computer or smartphone is not itself such a “system,” even if it connects to
one.239 Lavabit raised this argument in its appeal, but the Fourth Circuit did
not reach its merits, leaving the issue undecided.240
On the other hand, the exchange of session keys for encrypting
communications does entail such a system, making that exchange look like
an “electronic communication.”241 A court might conclude that it is, but
that session keys are not content information. If so, it could authorize the
side-channel seizure under the Pen Register Act (Title III of ECPA)—
provided it also finds that session keys count as “dialing, routing,
233
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in
Criminal Investigations, EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT’YS 1 app. at 249 (2009).
234
Since ECPA’s enactment, “electronic surveillance has been governed primarily, not by
decisions of [the Supreme] Court, but by the [ECPA] statute, which authorizes but imposes detailed
restrictions on electronic surveillance.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
235
18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012).
236
Id. § 2703(a), (b).
237
Id. § 2510(12) (“[E]lectronic communication” means “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce”).
See also id. § 2510(8) (“contents” of a wire, oral, or electronic communication means “any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication”).
238
See supra notes 21, 22 and accompanying text.
239
United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837–38 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (noting the Act’s
definition of “electronic communications” applies only to data that is in fact being transmitted beyond a
local computer by a system that affects interstate commerce).
240
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 275, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2014). Lavabit contended that the SCA did
not authorize a warrant to seize its private SSL keys on the grounds they were not “electronic
communications” under ECPA, since there is never any “transfer” or “transmission” of Lavabit’s
private keys. Lavabit Brief, supra note 218, at 18–19.
241
See Felten, supra note 21, at 3.
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242

addressing, or signaling information.” This seems doubtful: the purpose
of a session key is to protect a message’s confidentiality and integrity,243
not help deliver the message it encrypts. If the court concluded, though,
that the session keys are “contents,” it could then authorize a wiretap order
allowing the interception of session keys as they are being exchanged
between the target and the target’s interlocutor.244
In sum, the content/non-content distinction is a crux of the legal
analysis of an electromagnetic key-extraction attack, and courts must
carefully consider the particular type(s) of encryption key sought to be
seized.245
C. Where: Side-Channel Attacks and Constitutionally-Protected Areas
A Fourth Amendment analysis of a side-channel attack must also take
into account where the end point being targeted is located and where the
police (and their equipment) are located. The modern understanding of the
Fourth Amendment since Katz is that it “protects people, not places.”246
Nevertheless, the property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment
remains a viable doctrine, available whenever the police accomplish a
trespassory intrusion on privacy.247
The Supreme Court’s application of the property-based and Katz
doctrines has been confusing. The home has always held a special place in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, making it the “most commonly litigated

242
18 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 3127(3) (defining “pen register” as “a device or process which records or
decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication”).
243
See Felten, supra note 21, at 3, 4.
244
18 U.S.C. § 2516 (authorizing interception of electronic communications); id. § 2510(4)
(“‘[I]ntercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”).
245
Content/non-content distinctions among different types of encryption keys could create
practical headaches for investigators. An electromagnetic side-channel key-extraction attack could
putatively sweep in several kinds of key; if some are “content” and others not, investigators risk
exceeding the authorization issued by the court. For example, a pen register order does not allow the
collection of content information. See id. § 3127(3). A court challenge might necessitate an in-depth
analysis of how the attack worked, how the attack equipment was configured, and exactly what
information it did or did not collect. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 575, 581–82 (carefully analyzing
whether keystroke logger intercepted wire communications, where agents had obtained search warrants
but not a wiretap order). Out of caution, investigators who do not know beforehand what information
their side-channel attack will yield might choose to apply for a wiretap order, despite the heightened
showing this would require. See In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth.,
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (setting forth ECPA’s four broad categories of electronic
surveillance, “arranged from highest to lowest legal process for obtaining court approval”).
246
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
247
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test has been added to, not substituted for,” the property-based rubric).
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248

area of protected privacy.” In its “incoherent” jurisprudence on cases
involving “sense-enhancing” surveillance, the Court appears to apply “a
more searching review” to techniques that intrude on the home than to
those that do not.249 More generally, whether a physical trespass occurred
“often seems determinative” in these cases.250
In Kyllo v. United States251 and the more-recent Florida v. Jardines,252
the Court found warrantless searches of the home using sense-enhancing
“devices” to be unconstitutional. In both cases, the home seemed to be the
dispositive factor, regardless of which rubric—Katz or property—the Court
was nominally applying. Similarly, in United States v. Jones,253 the Court
held unconstitutional the warrantless use of a GPS device affixed to a
vehicle—because it intruded on property.254 Jones clarified that the Katz
analysis applies to non-trespassory electronic surveillance,255 but left for
another day how the Fourth Amendment would play out in the case of a
non-trespassory intrusion upon privacy interests outside of the home.256
This lack of guidance complicates the task of analyzing the use of sidechannel key-recovery attacks against end-point devices. A warrant is
typically required when police monitor electronic devices that are inside a
home, but Kyllo creates an exception. Outside the home, a warrant may
also be required, but arriving at that answer is not straightforward. How the
attack is conducted proves highly important in both situations.
1. Side-Channel Attacks Against Devices in ConstitutionallyProtected Areas
The Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”257 Nevertheless,
the law places the home at the apex of Fourth Amendment protection.258 In
Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when law enforcement
agents use “sense-enhancing technology” to measure emissions from a
248

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 467–70 (2007) [hereinafter Steinberg]. Steinberg argued that “the
Fourth Amendment has no applicability to the vast majority of sense-enhanced searches” and that the
Supreme Court’s “arbitrary and inconsistent” decisions in such cases underscore the need for this area
to be regulated instead by statute. Id. at 466–67.
250
Steinberg, supra note 249, at 468.
251
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
252
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013).
253
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
254
Id. at 404, 412.
255
Id. at 411.
256
Id. at 412.
257
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
258
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (privacy expectations are at their height in a private home)).
249
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home, they must get a warrant. That rule applies to side-channel attacks
on devices that are located inside homes, and should extend to devices in
similar constitutionally-protected spaces such as offices as well.
In Kyllo, federal agents had warrantlessly used a thermal imaging
device to scan the Kyllo home from their position on a public street.260 The
Court ruled the scan an unconstitutional warrantless search.261 While
applying Katz, the Court also emphasized the “firm,” “bright” line the
Fourth Amendment draws around the home.262 It held that “obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search—
at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public
use.”263 In an age of rapid technological change, the Court observed, the
nation’s federal courts must be prepared to prevent police technology from
eroding the Fourth Amendment’s privacy guarantees.264
Kyllo also held that the “made public” and “plain view” doctrines did
not foreclose Fourth Amendment protection. Generally, the Fourth
Amendment does not protect “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office.”265 Kyllo rejected the application of
this doctrine to waste heat emitted from a home, upending several
appellate-court decisions to the contrary.266 It also rejected the applicability
of the “plain view” doctrine, which applies to contraband left in plain view
or discarded trash set out by the curb, to a home’s waste heat emissions.267
Subsequently, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court held unconstitutional a
warrantless drug dog sniff on a defendant’s front porch.268 The Court again

259

Id. at 34; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419, 1425 (2013).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30.
261
Id. at 34–35.
262
Id. at 34–35, 40.
263
Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
264
Id. at 34 (courts must define “what limits there are upon th[e] power of technology to shrink
the realm of guaranteed privacy,” and must not “permit police technology to erode the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”).
265
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
266
United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases from the Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits), rev’d, 553 U.S. 27 (2001). The four-justice dissent in Kyllo
took this position as well, contending that a thermal-imaging device merely captures heat “waves
emanating from a private area into the public domain.” 553 U.S. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
majority rejected this “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment” as inconsistent with Katz,
wherein “the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone
booth.” Id. at 35.
267
Id. at 37–38 (residence’s warmth was an “intimate detail[] of the home”); see also id. at 42–43,
44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) & Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
268
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413, 1417–18 (2013).
260
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stressed the Fourth Amendment primacy of the home and its curtilage.269
But unlike in Kyllo, the Court based its decision not on Katz, but on the
property-based rubric of the Fourth Amendment.270 Thus, the longstanding
police use of drug-sniffing dogs as a “‘sense-enhancing’ tool” was not
determinative; rather, the physical intrusion onto property was key.271
Kyllo and Jardines both involved the home, but they need not be
limited to it. The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search
someone’s office or hotel room, too.272 That is because, although the home
is “first among equals,”273 the Fourth Amendment nevertheless
“safeguard[s] individuals from unreasonable government invasions of
legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the
four walls of the home.”274 Accordingly, police obtain warrants when they
wish to search or seize computers from the constitutionally-protected
spaces of offices and hotel rooms.275 That is consistent with both the
trespass-based approach to the Fourth Amendment (relied on in
Jardines)276 and the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy framework
(relied on in Kyllo).277 Therefore, despite the two cases’ confusing
emphasis on the special role of the home, this Article assumes that a court
would extend Kyllo and Jardines to the constitutionally-protected spaces
inside offices and hotel rooms.278
269

Id. at 1414, 1417–18 (home is “first among equals” under the Fourth Amendment).
Id. at 1414 (property-based approach “renders this case a straightforward one”).
271
Id. at 1417, 1419 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40).
272
Id. at 10–11 (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (hotel room); G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (office); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)
(office)).
273
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
274
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1977) (citations and footnote omitted) (listing
spaces requiring a warrant to search, including sealed packages and envelopes sent through the mail,
public phone booths, hotel rooms, offices, and automobiles on private premises or in police custody),
abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
275
See United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (federal agents executed a
search warrant on defendant’s hotel room and seized a laptop computer, which defendant had used to
share child pornography over peer-to-peer networks that he accessed online from hotel rooms across
the country); Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (police obtained warrants to enter Scarfo’s business office
and install a keylogger on his computer there).
276
See Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51–52 (holding, pre-Katz, that warrantless search of hotel room
violated its occupants’ Fourth Amendment rights; because the occupants “were not even present when
the entry, search and seizure were conducted,” the agents’ “intrusion was conducted surreptitiously and
by means denounced as criminal”).
277
A hotel guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her hotel room. Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
278
The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion examining the constitutionality of a drug dog
sniff in the hallway outside the unfortunately-named defendant Legall’s hotel room, rejected both a
Jardines argument that the hallway was within the curtilage of the hotel room and, consequently, a
Kyllo argument that the trained drug-sniffing dog was a “device not in general public use” that
infringed on his legitimate expectation of privacy. United States v. Legall, 585 F. App’x 4, 5–6 (4th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 410 (2005)). On that rationale,
270
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Kyllo and Jardines apply readily to law enforcement side-channel
attacks when the targeted electronic device is in someone’s home or office.
Devices’ EM emissions and the equipment to measure them are
comparable to the waste heat and thermal-imaging device in Kyllo.279 EM
emissions happen without any volitional action, or probably even
awareness, on the device owner’s part, meaning they are not “knowingly
expose[d] to the public”280 and do not fit the “plain view” standard. Even if
she knows about the emissions, the device’s owner may reasonably expect
that “‘observ[ing]’ [EM emissions] emanating from [the device] requires
sophisticated equipment that a trash picker probably does not have.”281
In short, under Kyllo, when a device in a home or office throws off EM
emissions into the open air, it is “not determinative” for Fourth
Amendment purposes “that information is made publicly available, at least
where access requires technology”—as recovering encryption keys from
EM emissions assuredly does.282
Consequently, the use of EM emission-measuring equipment against a
device inside a home or office indisputably requires a warrant if police
physically intrude on the property to conduct the attack, as in Jardines
(because the property rubric applies). If the device is inside a protected
space but police carry out the side-channel attack from a public vantage
point (i.e., without a physical trespass), Kyllo and the Katz test require
them to get a warrant—unless the police’s device is in general public use, a
variable explored in Section III.E below.283
2. Side-Channel Attacks Against Devices Outside of Protected Areas
Kyllo and Jardines demonstrate that both Fourth Amendment rubrics
can protect privacy interests inside the home. What, then, is the proper test
when police conduct a non-trespassory side-channel attack to measure the
narrow hallways in hotels or office buildings might be a boon to law enforcement agents conducting
side-channel attacks, as a thin or nonexistent curtilage is compatible with the very close proximity that
electromagnetic side-channel attacks presently require.
279
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (“Thermal imagers detect infrared
radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye.”). “Infrared
radiation is a type of electromagnetic radiation.” Jim Lucas, What Is Infrared?, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 26,
2015, 2:52 AM), http://www.livescience.com/50260-infrared-radiation.html [https://perma.cc/8B6KC9R5] (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
280
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
281
Stephen A. LaFleur, Kyllo v. United States: Something Old, Nothing New; Mostly Borrowed,
What To Do?, 62 LA. L. REV. 929, 946 (2002).
282
Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 440 (2012) [hereinafter Henderson, After Jones].
283
For now, the physical-trespass situation is more likely. As described earlier, EM key-recovery
attacks presently work only at very close distances, meaning the sensing equipment likely would need
to be located right up against the wall of the home. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text. Law
enforcement agents would have to either be on the property during the attack, or at least enter onto it in
order to place their equipment there before retreating off the property to carry the attack out.
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emissions from an electronic device that is not in a protected space such as
the target’s home or office (e.g., a laptop in use in a cafe)? The Supreme
Court has stated that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test
applies to non-trespassory electronic surveillance. Kyllo’s “senseenhancing technology not in general public use” rule should extend to this
context, too, though the Court has not clarified whether it does so.
a. The Katz Framework Applies to Non-Trespassory SideChannel Attacks
The 2012 Supreme Court case United States v. Jones284 clarified that
the Katz rule governs novel “nontrespassory surveillance techniques” for
search and seizure of information.285 In Jones, police physically mounted a
GPS tracking device on a vehicle and tracked its movements for 28 days.286
The Court unanimously agreed that this was a search, but not why.287
The majority opinion based its reasoning on the GPS installation’s
physical intrusion on the defendant’s “effect”—the vehicle.288 It applied
the property-based Fourth Amendment rubric, vigorously rejecting the idea
that the Katz test had replaced it.289
In concurring opinions, multiple justices expressed doubts about the
property-based rubric’s applicability in situations of non-trespassory
electronic surveillance.290 In response, the majority opinion clarified that
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”291
Jones establishes that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy”
framework applies to the novel non-trespassory electronic surveillance
method of electromagnetic key-extraction attacks. Therefore, if a device’s
284

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 953–54; see also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
286
Id. at 948–49.
287
Id. at 949. Compare id. at 954 (majority opinion) (the installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle constituted trespass, and therefore a physical intrusion), with id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Government obtained personal information without a valid warrant and
without the respondent’s consent, and therefore invaded the respondent’s property interests), and id. at
964 (Alito, J., concurring) (opining that the lengthy monitoring of vehicle’s movements violated the
defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy).
288
Id. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted).
289
Id. at 950–51, 953.
290
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion pointed out that the majority’s trespass-based framework
did not adequately account for “cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as
opposed to physical, contact.” Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor agreed with him,
cautioning in her own separate concurrence that the trespass rubric would be of little help in cases
involving “electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion
on property.” Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
291
Id. at 953; see also id. at 954 (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis;
but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”) (internal quotation omitted).
285
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owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information revealed
by the device’s EM emissions, then a non-trespassory side-channel attack
on those emissions will require a warrant.292
b. Privacy Protections for Electronic Devices and Their Contents
The Fourth Amendment is not read narrowly to protect only “the
catalog (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’)” of categories its text
enumerates.293 “[E]ffects” encompasses the closed containers that hold
them.294 Computers and smartphones are analogous (if imperfectly) to
containers as electronic “repositor[ies] of personal effects.”295 Several
appeals courts have extended the “container” analogy to computers,296
finding them generally subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.297
In addition, the amount and sensitivity of the personal information in
those “containers” gives rise to an independent layer of protection for that
data, even if an exception applies that would otherwise subject the
container to a warrantless search. Because our cell phones provide “a
digital record of nearly every aspect of [our] lives,” the Supreme Court
held in Riley v. California that a warrant is required for searches of cell
phones incident to arrest.298 Ordinarily, closed containers found on an
arrestee’s person may be searched without a warrant.299 But our phones are
not like other “containers,” an analogy the Court viewed skeptically.300
292
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing a twopart reasonableness test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy exists).
293
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
294
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (holding that a warrant was needed to search
a locked footlocker, because someone who manifests an expectation of privacy by “placing personal
effects inside a double-locked footlocker” is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection “[n]o less than
one who locks the doors of his home against intruders”).
295
Id. at 13.
296
E.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718–19 (10th Cir. 2007) (deciding to categorize
computers alongside suitcases and footlockers); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402–04 (4th Cir.
2001) (analogizing password-protected files on a shared computer to the footlocker in Chadwick).
297
E.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Individuals generally
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers.”) (citations omitted); Guest v.
Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Home owners would of course have a reasonable expectation
of privacy … in their belongings — including computers — inside the home.”). For a discussion of a
“device-centric” theory of Fourth Amendment privacy, see Jonathan Mayer, Constitutional Malware
19–21 & nn.58–68 (Nov. 14, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2633247
[https://perma.cc/A6B8-7KJJ].
298
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2472, 2473, 2479, 2491 (2014).
299
Id. at 2483–84 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973)).
300
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (calling analogy “a bit strained”). At worst, the Court thought the
analogy wholly inapt with regard to data that police view locally on a phone but that is stored remotely
in the cloud. Id. The prevalence of cloud storage illustrated the analogy’s shortcomings: containers may
be searched incident to arrest, but Riley established that electronic devices are not subject to that
exception, in part because of the possibility that some information that is viewable on a phone is in fact
stored remotely. Id. The Court’s recognition of the container analogy’s limitations is noteworthy and
laudable. Unfamiliar technologies may prompt judges to draw analogies to the familiar physical
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Rather, it concluded that police must get a warrant due to the “broad array
of private information” our cell phones reveal about us.301
In short, people generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against the warrantless search and seizure of their electronic devices and
the information they contain, irrespective of whether the device is located
inside or outside the home.302
c. Extending the Kyllo Rule to Side-Channel Attacks on Devices
Outside Constitutionally-Protected Areas
In an electromagnetic key-recovery attack, agents seize an encryption
key by measuring side-channel information emitted by an electronic
device, without physically seizing the device to obtain information from it.
Such non-trespassory surveillance is evaluated under the Katz “reasonable
expectation of privacy” framework.303 There is generally a reasonable
expectation of privacy against warrantless electronic surveillance of
devices and their contents.304 Since a device’s owner has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the device and the information its EM emissions
reveal, it follows that a non-trespassory side-channel attack should
generally require a warrant, no matter where the device is located.
However, under Kyllo, police must get a warrant to use “senseenhancing technology” such as side-channel attack equipment only if the
device is not “in general public use”—at least as to surveillance of the
home.305 Should this rule extend to EM side-channel attacks against
devices in a public place, which involve no intrusion into the home or
seizure of the device itself?
On the one hand, it is challenging to know how to apply Kyllo outside
the home. The opinion focuses heavily on the home, but not in a
world—which, if inapt, can lead to flawed legal outcomes and poor public-policy choices. Orin S. Kerr,
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801, 875–76 (2004).
301
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491, 2485 (“[Cell phones] place vast quantities of personal information
literally in the hands of individuals”), 2494–95 (“[w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal, they
hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”) (citation omitted).
302
This expectation does not turn on whether the device’s owner “locks” it by encrypting and/or
password-protecting it. Such measures’ legal effect is unsettled. Compare Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403
(“By using a password, Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude [the computer’s other user] and
others from his personal files. . . . Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the passwordprotected computer files and . . ., therefore, has alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”),
with Rozenshtein, supra note 61, at *30 (“one scholarly debate asks whether merely encrypting a
communication is enough to raise a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, thus triggering Fourth
Amendment protections”) (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption
Create a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2001) (positing that
“encryption cannot create Fourth Amendment protection”)).
303
See supra Section III.C.2.a.
304
See supra Section III.C.2.b.
305
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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particularly coherent way that would guide its application outside that
context. Professor Henderson believes that Kyllo’s fixation on the home
and its special role, while failing to engage directly with the legal
consequences (under the third-party doctrine) of Kyllo’s failure to block
the radiation emanating from his home, “renders the entire opinion of
questionable significance outside the context of the home.”306
Yet there is a strong argument that Kyllo should extend to side-channel
attacks that measure EM emissions from devices in public spaces. This
seems intuitively correct given that Kyllo itself involved the measurement
of side-channel information.307 A side-channel attack on an electronic
device in public is like the thermal imaging of the Kyllo home: it is a nontrespassory intrusion, conducted from a public vantage point, to measure
information that is protected as private,308 from something that is
constitutionally protected (the container-like electronic device here, the
home in Kyllo).
Further, if we apply the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test
(as Kyllo did and as Jones requires), Katz itself is also closely analogous. A
device that collects EM emissions radiated from a target’s computer or cell
phone in public is similar to the eavesdropping device that picked up sound
waves emitted from the phone booth in Katz.309 It did not matter to the
Court that Katz made his calls from a glass-walled phone booth in public:
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”310 so it “nonetheless
protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because he ‘justifiably
relied’ upon the privacy of the telephone booth.”311
Just as someone who goes into a phone booth and closes the door
behind him before placing a call “is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world,”312
someone discreetly using a laptop or cell phone in public may reasonably
306
Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of
Fourth Amendment Speech, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 540–44 (2004) (calling the opinion “far from a
model of judicial clarity,” leaving it “questionable what [the five-justice majority] would hold outside
the context of the home”).
307
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29 (“infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not
visible to the naked eye”).
308
Private encryption keys, which a court could deem particularly sensitive in keeping with
Riley’s concern with not just the quantity, but also the sensitive quality of the information that our
electronic devices hold about us. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (“[C]ertain types of data are also
qualitatively different.”). A court might view encryption keys as especially sensitive information
because encryption is what protects from snooping eyes the other kinds of private and sensitive
information that concerned the Riley Court. See id. (listing, e.g., Internet browsing history revealing
searches for disease symptoms, and apps that would reveal political and religious affiliations, addiction,
pregnancy, and personal budget details).
309
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36.
310
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
311
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
312
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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expect that police are not surreptitiously spying on that usage. This is
doubly true of the electromagnetic emissions that reveal encryption keys.
Even if a cell phone’s user could not reasonably expect his WhatsApp
phone call to remain private if he conducted it loudly on speaker-phone
while strolling down the main thoroughfare, this behavior (though
obnoxious) does nothing to expose the app’s secret encryption keys to the
public. Those, he may reasonably expect will remain private.
Extending Kyllo to spaces outside the home also avoids an absurd
result. Kyllo creates an exception to the warrant requirement for use of
sense-enhancing technology to measure otherwise-private information
about the interior of a home, where the technology is “in general public
use.”313 But as noted, people generally have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phones and laptops wherever they may be. It would
make little sense for a device to be subject to the Kyllo exception while it is
inside the home, where the Fourth Amendment’s protection is supposedly
at its zenith, but receive more robust protection once it leaves the home.
Kyllo’s “general public use” rule thus should extend to side-channel
attacks against devices when they are in public spaces, not just in the
home. Adapted for electronic devices, the Kyllo test reads: where the
government uses sense-enhancing technology that is not in general public
use, to explore details of an electronic device that would previously have
been unknowable without a physical intrusion into the device, the
surveillance constitutes a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant.314
An electromagnetic key-recovery attack seeks to learn information for
purposes of extracting private keys from an electronic device (and,
ultimately, obtaining plaintext using the extracted keys). That information
“would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”;315
that is, direct physical access to the device—hence the need for a sidechannel attack.316 Accordingly, if the side-channel attack uses a senseenhancing device that is not in general public use, the police must get a
warrant. If the device is in general public use, no warrant is necessary. The
next Section delves into the “general public use” analysis.
E. How: Analyzing Sense-Enhancing Side-Channel Key-Recovery
Equipment under the Kyllo “General Public Use” Test
Just how law enforcement agents carry out a side-channel attack is a
critical final step in the Fourth Amendment analysis. Stated simply, when
313

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
See id. at 34, 40.
315
Id. at 40.
316
See supra Section II.D.
314
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the how of non-trespassory surveillance means using a “sense-enhancing
technology” that is “not in general public use,” Kyllo says the police must
get a warrant.317
In announcing this rule, the Court strove to “take the long view” of the
Fourth Amendment in light of technological advances.318 It refused to
“leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology,” noting that
while the thermal imaging device at issue “was relatively crude, the rule
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already
in use or in development.”319
Nevertheless, the rule Kyllo announced is very fact-dependent, and its
outcome can change over time as society acclimates to new technologies.
Attacks that measure side-channel information such as minute vibrations,
sounds inaudible to the human ear, or electromagnetic emissions not on the
visible spectrum,320 indisputably require “sense-enhancing” equipment. But
yesterday’s “sophisticated system” is tomorrow’s “crude” tool. That is, a
device that was “not in general public use” at the time Kyllo was decided
would not necessarily still qualify as such today, and what qualifies today
may come into “general public use” in the future.
1. What Makes a Device “in General Public Use”?
The side-channel attack technologies discussed in Section I doubtless
enhance the human senses under Kyllo. But not every “sense-enhancing
technology” is “not in general public use.” What, then, makes a device “in
general public use”? Commentators have suggested several factors to be
taken into account: cost, availability, legal restrictions, consumer choice,
and social norms.
According to commentator Stephen A. LaFleur, “[g]eneral public use
is a function of cost, availability, and the lack of statutory restrictions on
possession.”321 These factors are intertwined: “[g]iven the cost trends in
consumer electronic devices,” greater affordability of a device will lead to
greater availability, but “government restriction” will hinder availability.322
Professor Stephen E. Henderson suggested factors akin to LaFleur’s,
but added social norms.323 The Kyllo “general public use” test, intersecting
as it does with the Katz “reasonable expectation” test, refers to what
behaviors society considers normal and expected, not what behaviors are
317

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
Id. at 40.
319
Id. at 35–36 (footnote omitted).
320
Professor Steinberg points out that the sense the thermal-imaging device amplified in Kyllo by
measuring infrared radiation was that of touch (to detect heat), not sight. Steinberg, supra note 249, at
469–70.
321
LaFleur, supra note 281, at 945.
322
Id.
323
Henderson, After Jones, supra note 282, at 440, 445.
318
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possible. That is, Kyllo “look[s] not to what persons could do, but to what
they actually do.”324 What behavior is normal, though, is determined in
part by statutory strictures, i.e., “what the law permits and prohibits.”325
Thus, whether a device is “in general public use” “will depend not solely
upon developments in technology and consumer choice, but also upon any
statutory restrictions on the sale or use of such devices.”326
Cost, legality, and availability are clearly fundamental, as Professor
Henderson and LaFleur agree. But “availability” and “social norms” are
concepts with some subtlety to them. For example, “community band”
(CB) radios are available from Radio Shack,327 but they are used mainly by
truckers; most people nowadays just use cell phones.328 Yet thanks to
Smokey and the Bandit, the general public knows about CB radios.329
Consequently, even if a device is only “in general public use” within a
particular market or community (anymore), the general public’s awareness
of the device should factor into the Katz/Kyllo analysis.
What is more, “availability” and “social norms” interact in an
unexpected way when common components are repurposed to an
uncommon end. For example, well-known (fictional) government agent
MacGyver could use his Swiss army knife to cobble together a working
proof-of-concept from whatever ordinary items he had at hand, and use it
to save the day.330 His end device was not “available” by itself, even if its
components were common. Plus, the audience was supposed to find his
creation a remarkable accomplishment.331 That is, in reality, maybe people
could assemble a sleeping bag, some vodka, and an oxygen tank into a
bomb in order to escape a plane buried in an avalanche,332 but what people
(most of whom are not genius scientists)333 probably would actually do in
that situation is get comfortable in the sleeping bag, alternate between hits
324

Id. at 440; see also id. at 438 (“What unrelated private persons actually do is a much more
limited universe than what they are theoretically able or permitted to do.”).
325
Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
326
Id.
327
Radios & Scanners: CB Radios, RADIO SHACK, https://www.radioshack.com/collections/cbradios [https://perma.cc/LK84-T8MS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
328
CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & CARY O’DELL, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
RADIO 150 (Routledge eds., 2010).
329
Id.
330
MacGyver – Premise, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacGyver#Premise (last
visited Feb. 12, 2017).
331
See MacGyver – Impact, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacGyver#Impact (last
visited Feb. 12, 2017) (referencing “[t]he character’s ability to use everyday objects to perform
extraordinary feats”).
332
See Sam Greenspan, 11 Most Absurd Inventions Created by MacGyver, 11 POINTS (June 7,
2011 11:00 AM), http://www.11points.com/TV/11_Most_Absurd_Inventions_Created_By_MacGyver
[https://perma.cc/J2Z6-XNK6] (describing the episode “Gold Rush”).
333
Angus MacGyver, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angus_MacGyver (last visited
Feb. 12, 2017).
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of vodka and pure, sweet oxygen, and quietly resign themselves to the
looming inevitability of death.
To cut to the chase: under Professor Henderson’s norms-based
approach, if MacGyver had ever grabbed some common household items
and built a side-channel device to spy on a suspected bad guy, a court
applying the Kyllo test would not consider the resulting contraption to be
“in general public use” no matter how quotidian its components.334
This Article therefore proposes the following factors for courts to
consider in determining whether a sense-enhancing device is “in general
public use,” building upon the LaFleur and Henderson models: How much
does it cost? How easy is it to get (i.e., can people buy it at Radio Shack, or
from Amazon or eBay)? Is it legal to own and use? Is it common among
the general public? If not, is it common within an established niche market
or community, and how aware is the general public of that niche use? How
much assembly is required to use the device, and how common are its
components? These considerations should be evaluated in totality to
determine whether the technology at issue is “in general public use,” with
the fundamental factors of cost, availability, and legality being accorded
the most weight.
2. Is Side-Channel Attack Equipment “in General Public Use”?
Finally, let us apply the “general public use” factors suggested above
to side-channel attack equipment.
For starters, Kyllo, with its thermal-imaging devices (which measure
side-channel information about a home’s relative warmth), would probably
come out differently today. Writing in 2002, LaFleur predicted that
thermal-imaging devices like the one in Kyllo would one day be found on
the shelves at Radio Shack (unless restricted by law), and that thermalimaging technology “might be found not to be a search” if the same fact
pattern in Kyllo were decided now.335 Fully seven years ago, Professor
Kerr opined that this state of affairs had indeed come to pass.336
A more recent real-world case is also instructive, though it did not
334
Outside the context of side-channel attacks, an ingenious “one-off” MacGyver device might be
deemed “in general public use” if it is a stand-in for an existing device that is undeniably in general
public use, such as a defibrillator. See Greenspan, supra note 332 (describing the episode “The Enemy
Within”).
335
LaFleur, supra note 281, at 945 (emphasis added).
336
In 2010, Professor Kerr wrote in a blog post that thermal imaging devices had become so
widely available, at such an affordable price point, that a contemporary court applying the Kyllo rule
might no longer come out the same way the Supreme Court had in 2001. Orin Kerr, Can the Police
Now Use Thermal Imaging Devices Without a Warrant? A Reexamination of Kyllo in Light of the
Widespread Use of Infrared Temperature Sensors, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 4, 2010 12:33 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/01/04/can-the-police-now-use-thermal-imaging-devices-without-a-warrant-areexamination-of-kyllo-in-light-of-the-widespread-use-of-infrared-temperature-sensors/
[https://perma.cc/5GZP-TP5A].
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actually apply Kyllo. In United States v. Stanley, law enforcement agents
used a software/hardware equipment combination to track down a
suspected child pornography offender.337 Called the “MoocherHunter,” the
software/equipment combination “is a mobile tracking software tool that
can be downloaded for free from the manufacturer’s website and used by
anyone with a laptop computer and a directional antenna” to track down
the wireless card of a computer that is “mooching” off a wifi signal.338 The
government did not contend that the “MoocherHunter” was technology “in
general public use” under Kyllo.339
The Third Circuit did not question that position, because it declined to
apply the Kyllo “general public use” test.340 If we do so, then, applying the
“in general public use” factors outlined above, cost favors an “in general
public use” finding. The software was free, and a directional antenna can
be ordered online for around $50.341 Likewise availability: the software
was available for download, laptops are everywhere, and directional
antennas are common enough. However, the fact that MoocherHunter was
developed for law enforcement use342 cuts the other way, apparently
dispositively. The general public is probably not aware of this niche
software tool for the law enforcement community. Thus, while a laptop
337

753 F.3d 114, 115–17 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 116. The court used the term “MoocherHunter” to refer collectively to the software and
the equipment using it. Id. at 116 n.5. While wifi signal emissions can be considered side-channel
information, the government’s use of MoocherHunter was not a side-channel attack per se.
339
Id. at 119. Before using the MoocherHunter, state and federal government agents discussed
whether to obtain a warrant, and decided not to, both out of practical considerations and the distinctions
they drew between the MoocherHunter and Kyllo. Id. at 117.
340
Id. at 119–20. Instead, the court concluded that by intentionally sharing contraband child
pornography online using his neighbor’s wifi connection, “Stanley deliberately ventured beyond the
privacy protections of the home, and thus, beyond the safe harbor provided by Kyllo.” Id. (citation
omitted). This has led Stanley to be criticized as wrongly decided. See Andersen, supra note 298, at 2–
3. Professor Kerr, by contrast, considers Stanley to be correctly decided under the third-party doctrine.
Orin Kerr, United States v. Stanley and the Fourth Amendment Implications of Using
“Moocherhunter” To Locate the User of An Unsecured Wireless Network, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Nov. 19, 2012 10:48 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/11/19/united-states-v-stanley-and-the-fourthamendment-implications-of-using-moocherhunter-to-locate-the-user-of-an-unsecured-wirelessnetwork/ [https://perma.cc/TYP3-J3P3].
341
E.g., Yagi WiFi Antenna 2.4GHz Outdoor Directional 14d, SIMPLEWIFI,
http://www.simplewifi.com/yagi-wifi-antenna-2-4ghz-outdoor-directional-14d.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2017) (selling for $54.00). [https://perma.cc/HR4L-U2FA] The Stanley opinion does not specify
what make and model of directional antenna was used. However, in a MoocherHunter demonstrational
video, the software’s developers use an antenna that appears highly similar to the $54 white Yagi
antenna. Id. See The OSWA-Assistant(tm), THINKSECURE, http://securitystartshere.org/page-trainingoswa-assistant.htm#moocherhunter [https://perma.cc/3NPB-BTT7] (embedded video displays
directional antenna starting at approximately 13:40 minutes) (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
342
See MoocherHunter 0.9.0.8, TECHSPOT, http://www.techspot.com/downloads/6215moocherhunter.html [https://perma.cc/R3RS-BXZK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (stating that
MoocherHunter is Singaporean software originally presented to the Southeast Asian law enforcement
community in 2008).
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and a directional antenna are affordable, available, and legal, once they
were combined with obscure software for police use, the government in
Stanley did not try to argue that the overall MoocherHunter
hardware/software combination was in general public use.
Next, reviewing the key-extraction techniques discussed in Section I
above, some would not fare well under a Kyllo analysis informed by
Stanley and the “in general public use” factors suggested above. This is
due to cost. The Genkin team’s through-the-wall EM key-extraction attack
used an antenna that costs 500 euro—expensive enough to put that attack
in the “not in general public use” category.343 Likewise, the “portable”
microphone set-up the team used to enhance the range of their RSA keyextraction attack was lab-grade equipment344 too expensive and specialized
to be “in general public use.” Those attacks require a warrant under Kyllo.
But otherwise, the Genkin team made it a point to use cheap hardware
components that can be ordered off eBay or scavenged from equipment
already in one’s possession.345 The expensive “portable” set-up for the
RSA key-extraction attack can be substituted by a variation that uses just a
mobile phone (though the attack then works only up to 30 centimeters).346
And in the case of the “pita bread” attack, the team developed an
alternative to the pita bread set-up that requires only a regular household
radio, plus an audio recorder to record the signal output.347
The mobile-phone and consumer-radio set-ups check off the crucial
cost, availability, and legality boxes—they are common among the general
public—and they minimize the “some assembly required” factor.348 A
mobile phone, “innocuously place[d] . . . on the desk next to the target
343

See ECDH Key-Extraction, supra note 43, at 11 (specifying use of Aaronia Magnetic Direction
Finder MDF 9400 antenna); Magnetic Antenna MDF 9400, AARONIA, http://www.aaronia.com/
products/antennas/MDF-9400/ [https://perma.cc/T6GU-A3UU] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (giving list
price of €499.95 on manufacturer’s website).
344
See RSA Key Extraction, supra note 41, at 10 (describing a portable setup with a Brüel & Kjær
model 4190 microphone capsule, model 2669 preamplifier, and model 5935 microphone power
supply). At the time of this writing, a kit comprising the Brüel & Kjær 4190 and 2669 was for sale used
on eBay for $990, and a used 5935 for around $350. Bruel Kjaer 4190 + 2669 BK B&K free field
microphone preamp kit, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/itm/Bruel-Kjaer-4190-2669-BK-B-K-free-fieldmicrophone-preamp-kit-/182733184678 [https://perma.cc/B3XH-GPKH] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017);
Bruel & Kjaer 5935 Dual Input Microphone Preamp, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/itm/Bruel-Kjaer5935-Dual-Input-Microphone-Preamp-/302402783935?epid=2156001266 (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
345
ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 1, 15–16; STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40,
at 4 (attack “us[ed] simple and readily available equipment” or, in the alternative, “a common,
consumer-grade radio,” again “avoid[ing] the expensive equipment used in prior attacks”).
346
RSA Key Extraction, supra note 41, at 10–11, 27.
347
STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, at 22–23. The pita bread set-up itself did not
require anything expensive or hard to obtain; it used a software-defined radio (SDR) dongle, id. at 14,
21, which is arguably cheap and available enough to be, taken alone, “in general public use.” See
Woodward, supra note 23 (noting that SDRs cost less than £30).
348
All of the equipment the team used in the various attacks is presumably legal to own,
otherwise the researchers might have thought twice about talking about it in a series of published
papers.
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laptop” in order to secretly measure its EM emissions, would likely
qualify under Kyllo as a “sense-enhancing” device that is “in general
public use.” Therefore, a court might rule that police need not get a warrant
to conduct that particular key-extraction attack in that particular manner. A
court might well reach the same conclusion as to the attack that requires
only a consumer-grade radio and an audio recorder.350
The Genkin team’s research demonstrates that side-channel attack
equipment can potentially “pass” the Kyllo “general public use” test if law
enforcement repurposes common items, such as a cell phone or radio, to
new, surveillance-oriented purposes—without even having to “MacGyver”
a bunch of parts together.
For perspective, repurposing common household items on the cheap to
do a side-channel attack is a thirty-year-old strategy. Wim van Eck’s
TEMPEST-style attack against a monitor (now popularly named after him)
cost him $15 in equipment and a regular TV set in 1985.351 A side-channel
attack involving “van Eck phreaking” of a target’s computer monitor
almost certainly would not require a warrant under the Kyllo “general
public use” test in 2017. Indeed, LaFleur, writing back in 2002, believed
that the Kyllo ruling would likely extend to a TEMPEST-style attack using
a device that “is completely passive and detects the modulated
electromagnetic emissions from the [computer’s] keyboard or display”
from a vantage point outside the building.352
It may seem like a surprising outcome that some side-channel attacks
do not require a warrant. In practice, a court might prove reluctant to allow
“technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”353 in the electronic
devices that hold so many details of our lives. Few laypeople have
probably heard of side-channel cryptanalysis, so allowing the warrantless
use of an “in general public use” cell phone or household radio, repurposed
into “sense-enhancing technology” to extract private encryption keys from
a laptop, may be a bridge too far. Applying Professor Henderson’s “social
norms” factor, people could repurpose a phone or radio into surveillance
devices, but that is not what people actually do. The court might be
tempted to reject the application of the Kyllo test, as the Third Circuit did
in Stanley, and resort to the classic Katz inquiry. If the court “ask[s]
whether people reasonably expect” that their computers’ electromagnetic
349

RSA Key Extraction, supra note 41, at 5–6.
STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, at 22–23.
351
van Eck, supra note 17, at 270; see also Christopher J. Seline, Eavesdropping on the
Compromising Emanations of Electronic Equipment: The Laws of England and the United States, 23
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (1991) (putting the price point for “see[ing] what someone is typing
on their computer screen from several hundred yards away” at under $200 in “easily-available parts” in
an article published ten years before the Kyllo decision).
352
LaFleur, supra note 281, at 948.
353
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
350
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emissions “will be recorded” and analyzed “in a manner that enables the
government to ascertain, more or less at will,”354 their private keys (and
thus the plaintext of their private information), then the government’s
warrantless use of a side-channel key-recovery attack might be held not to
pass constitutional muster.
Professor Henderson’s “social norms” factor was not expressly
included in the Supreme Court’s formulation of the Kyllo rule, but it may
be required to reconcile Kyllo with Katz’s “reasonable expectation”
yardstick in order to avoid a result many would consider absurd. A
straightforward inquiry into whether a device is “in general public use”
that does not account for a non-standard use of that technology may be too
“mechanical [an] interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.”355 Thus, to the
Kyllo “general public use” factors listed above, it may be necessary to add
yet another: If the device itself is in general public use, has it been
modified or otherwise used in a non-standard manner? That is, is the use
not a “general public use”? Adding that element would tilt the Kyllo factors
more decisively toward the conclusion that, for each of the clever sidechannel attack equipment set-ups discussed above, the device is not in
general public use and thus requires a warrant when employed by police.
F. The Katz/Kyllo Framework Cannot Adequately Protect Privacy Against
Advances in Law Enforcement Technology
Kyllo attempted to announce a rule the Court anticipated could be
applied flexibly to unknown future technologies without compromising
traditional privacy interests. In practice, however, this rule guaranteed that
evolving technologies would gradually eat away at privacy over time.
The very possibility that a court might hold that the mobile-phone and
household-radio attacks (or a van Eck phreaking attack) do not need a
warrant illustrates a shortcoming of the Kyllo test and of the Katz approach
more generally. Kyllo’s “not in general public use” rule was the Court’s
strategy for preserving longstanding expectations of privacy against the
encroachment of modern technology. The Court chose not to draw a line at
a particular level of technological sophistication or complexity (which was
wise), but rather, to focus on the technology’s obscurity.
This makes intuitive sense under the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test, yet at the same time it highlights a notorious difficulty of that
test. What is considered objectively reasonable changes over time, as
societal norms shift and technology progresses.356 Under Katz and Kyllo,
354

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
356
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the Katz test assumes people
have “a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those
expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in
355
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the bar for government action to comport with the Fourth Amendment is
gradually lowered, as once-wondrous inventions become humdrum357—
and people resign themselves to the lessening of their privacy.358
This approach does not square with encryption’s vital role in the
twenty-first century. Millions of Americans now use encryption to protect
the security and privacy of their electronic devices and data from snoops,
hackers, thieves, and other criminals—giving those bad actors an incentive
to devise new methods for undermining cryptographic protections. Under
the Katz/Kyllo framework, the proliferation of devices for bad actors to
sidestep encryption would perversely result in the relaxation of the warrant
requirement for seizures by the state. That is, the nefarious ingenuity of
criminals would lessen the constitutional constraints placed on the very
authorities charged with protecting us from them.
Absent a better rule for limiting technology’s incursions on privacy,
the eventual impact could be dire. “All human activity is susceptible to
observation in the form of energy reflection or emanation that is readily
captured and converted to ‘data.’”359 If the courts permit side-channel data
about us to be “pervasively captured, stored, and integrated with other
data” by police without so much as a warrant, “individual privacy becomes
a physical impossibility.”360 That is not the outcome the Kyllo Court
intended—quite the contrary—but that is how it may play out, as long as
Kyllo remains good law361 and the courts must continue to apply Katz to
novel forms of non-trespassory surveillance.362
CONCLUSION
Once side-channel attacks make the eventual jump from military and
intelligence to law enforcement use, judicial challenges to their
constitutionality will soon follow. This Article illustrates the shortcomings
of the present legal framework (such as it is) for seizure of encryption keys
flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”).
357
See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“the same technological advances that have made
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution
of societal privacy expectations”) (citing id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring)).
358
See id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if the public does not welcome the diminution of
privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as
inevitable.”) (footnote omitted).
359
LaFleur, supra note 281, at 948.
360
Id.
361
“[G]iven the continued advancement of technology and reduction of cost in ‘old technology,’
the ‘in general public use’ doctrine may lose viability.” United States v. Vargas, No. 13-cr-6025, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at *36 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) (citing Colin Shaff, Is the Court Allergic
to Katz? Problems Posed by New Methods of Electronic Surveillance to the “Reasonable-Expectationof-Privacy” Test, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 409, 448 (2014)).
362
Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”).
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by means of a side-channel attack.
Side-channel attacks that law enforcement conducts against electronic
devices located in a home or office are analyzed under the Kyllo
framework. Because the Fourth Amendment strongly protects those spaces,
obtaining side-channel information from devices inside them generally
requires a warrant. However, Kyllo’s “general public use” rule opens up an
exception. In time, that exception will permit the warrantless seizure of
side-channel information from an otherwise constitutionally-protected
space if the devices to do so become common enough. That rule is not a
principled way to make a decision about the privacy protections for an
encryption key, and the decision should not be left up to the courts.
For side-channel attacks conducted in public spaces, Jones dictates that
the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis applies. There is
generally a reasonable expectation of privacy in our electronic devices and
the information (including encryption keys) they contain. Therefore, the
Fourth Amendment will typically require a warrant for the seizure of
encryption keys via side-channel key-extraction attacks in public, as it does
for the home. Similarly, however, that standard will be undermined if the
Kyllo rule extends beyond the home context to non-trespassory
surveillance of electronic devices in public spaces.
In short, when it comes to cryptographic side-channel attacks, current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is ill-equipped to safeguard Americans’
privacy in the long term. What reform is most appropriate is beyond the
scope of this Article. That said, anticipating the advent of cryptographic
side-channel attacks by law enforcement presents a rare opportunity for us
to shape the law now, rather than reacting to technological change after the
fact. We would be well-advised not to waste that chance.

